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The Breaking New Ground Plan and its implementation in the pilot project 
known as the N2 Gateway is an important step in the conceptualization and 
delivery of social housing in South Africa. The National Department of 
Housing in BNG promotes the building of communities and not just the 
construction of houses as was allegedly the case in the previously built state 
housing. In practice, however, the N2 Gateway Project does not adequately 
adhere to the Breaking New Ground Strategy and is fraught with 
implementation problems. Whilst the N2 Gateway houses may in some cases 
be of a better quality, they are being built far away from economic 
opportunities and lack the specified social amenities and community facilities. 
The N2 Gateway project has been rushed, been plagued by poor planning 
and has failed to deliver within its time-frames. The failure to properly 
implement the N2 Gateway Project necessitates an analysis of the project and 
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This thesis examines the highly politicized and controversial N2 Gateway pilot 
project initiated in Cape Town in 2004, and still under construction. The 
dissertation adopts a critical approach to the analysis of the N2 Gateway 
Project, a pilot social housing project under the auspices of national, provincial 
and local government. This was the first occasion of a three tier government 
engagement in a social housing project. 
The first chapter of the dissertation introduces the argument that housing is an 
important vehicle for social and economic development. The following chapter 
discusses the research methodology used for this paper. Chapter three 
analyses the efficacy of previous housing projects as vehicles for 
development. The specificity of the N2 Gateway is described in Chapter 4 and 
special reference is made to the scope and vision of the project together with 
the reasons for why Cape Town and the N2 'area' were chosen as the site for 
the development initiative. Chapter five identifies and discusses the numerous 
problems which have plagued the project and its implementation. The major 
lessons that can be learnt from the initiative thus far are discussed in Chapter 
6. The dissertation concludes with a brief commentary on (1) the future of the 
project, (2) the possible alternatives to the N2 Gateway initiative as well as 
recommendations to the Breaking New Ground Plan. After Chapter seven 
there is a brief review of the shortcomings of the research process. I chose to 
place this discussion at the end of the dissertation as I am of the view that if it 










be able to understand fully the problems I have identified in the research 
process. 
The importance of housing for development 
Whether looking at housing from bottom up or top down, this is perhaps 
the most important component of social policy to get right. The 
employment potential, sUbstantial macroeconomic multipliers and 
relatively low import cost together mean that housing is well suited to 
playa central role in any progressive economic development strategy. 
From the standpoint of the household - particularly women caregivers -
decent housing improves family health and hygiene, provides privacy 
and a chance to raise children, and ensures the psychological security 
that comes from 'tenure' (the ability to stay in a house without fear of 
being displaced). Finally, secure, well integrated housing developments 
can enhance community and mutual aid activities within a given 
neighborhood - Patrick Bond 1. 
Housing development has proven to have a positive influence on community 
development. This can work to stimulate a country's macro-economic growth, 
together with positively influencing the development of social welfare 
initiatives. The N2 Gateway Housing Project is an initiative that is sorely 
needed in the Western Cape. The knock on effects of this particular project, 
according to the objectives of the initiative, will bring much needed 
development on both local and national scales. 
1 Bond, P. 2000. The Housing Question. In Elite Transition - From Apartheid to Neoliberalism 











Research Methodology and Design 
This dissertation, due to the controversial nature of the topic, required a great 
deal of in-depth research in order to give a balanced review of the N2 
Gateway project. The research methods that were used for this dissertation 
were made up of literature reviews and interviews. 
A considerable amount of literature is available on the N2 Gateway project. 
The texts used for this dissertation included: newspaper articles, academic 
books, business plans, minutes of meetings, speeches, government reports 
and official housing documents. These documents were elicited from the 
university library, government publications, housing officials and the internet. 
Numerous interviews were conducted for this thesis. The majority of these 
interviews were semi-structured in depth interviews. Housing experts, 
architects, party officials, project managers, academics and construction 
managers were interviewed for this dissertation. The interviews were recorded 
using pen and paper and the 'findings' from the interviews were written up 
after the interviews were conducted. In many instances it was not possible to 
meet with certain individuals in person and in these cases, .email interviews' 
were conducted. It was important to interview a large number of individuals, 
as this allowed for better insight into the controversial issues of the N2 
Gateway project. 












South Africa's Housing History 
1.1 Background to housing in South Africa 
1994 represented a watershed moment in the history of South Africa. With the 
African National Congress (ANC) coming to power, numerous changes were 
set in motion to try and rebuild a deeply divided nation. Housing was a critical 
issue for the new government. The reason for its importance was because 
apartheid legislation had enforced a discriminatory housing system that had 
caused a considerable amount of inequality and resentment amongst the 
majority of South Africans2. 
During apartheid, black South Africans in urban areas in particular were not 
able to acquire title hold, invest their own properties and acquire assets 
against which they could borrow. They were thus excluded from wealth 
creation and development opportunities3. The failure of the different state 
levels to provide sufficient social housing had a negative impact on family life 
(overcrowding, abuse, drugs, unrest), on community life and the necessary 
building of social capital and trust in modern communities. In all cases, the 
inadequate housing that was available was far from sites of economic 
2 Department of Housing, 1994. White Paper - A New Housing Policy and Strategy for South 
Africa. pp. 1-57. 











opportunities and transport nodes, causing access to housing sites to be 
costly, unsafe and generated insecuritl. 
Apartheid effectively dumped people of widely differing standards of living in 
remote, dusty townships where amongst other consequences, access to their 
places of work became a costly nightmare. The housing question that the 
ANC had to deal with was therefore not just a social issue but a major political 
and economic due to the legacy of the previous regime5. 
During apartheid thousands of Black, Coloured and Indian South Africans 
were forced to move. The areas that they were 'evicted' from were then 
developed into 'rich' white commercial properties or housing estates and 
compensation below market rates was given to those evicted. These people 
looked on with 'understandable envy' and anger at these new properties. Now 
that the ANC had come to power, these past imbalances were expected to be 
red ressed6 . 
The National Housing situation was in serious need of attention when the 
ANC government took over. The estimated housing backlog was estimated at 
around 3 million units in 1990 and each year an average of 200 000 new 
4 Breaking New Ground. 2004. A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable 
Human Settlements. Department of Housing, pp. 1-28. 
5 Turok, I & Watson, V. 2001. Divergent Development in South African Cities: Strategic 
Challenges FaCing Cape Town. In Urban Forum, pp. 119-138. 
6 Asmal, K. 2000. Ethnicity and Housing. Part Two: South Africa. Vermont, Ashgate 











households was being added to this lise. The required housing was thus a 
daunting task for the new South African Government to grapple with. What 
was of great concern for those responsible for housing development was that 
the campaign was starting off the back foot too as only 50 000 houses were 
built in 19928, 
The Mandela Government had inherited a fragmented and disjointed system 
of housing administration. This resulted in several major problems. Firstly, 
South African households' rent and service charges did not exist under one 
comprehensive system, which made organization problematic. Secondly, 
waiting lists were fragmented and had not been updated for a long time. 
Thirdly, no income surveys had been carried out for a long time and thus rents 
were therefore unrealistically low. In order to address these problems the ANC 
decided to adopt a comprehensive policy for housing the nation (This 
'comprehensive' policy in introduced in Chapter 3.2.1 )9. 
The Western Cape's housing demand greatly outweighed the housing supply 
in 1994. The housing shortage was just under 200 000 units when the ANC 
took power. The housing policies and practices in Cape Town and adjacent 
7 Khan, F & Thring, P. 2003. Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Sandown, Heinemann Publishers (Pty) Ltd. pp. 1-132. 
8 Human Settlements Reference Group. 2005. Draft Discussion Document to inform the 
development of a Strategy and Implementation Plan in the Western Cape for 'Breaking New 
Ground': A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements. 
October 7, pp. 1-49. 
9 Behrens, R & Watson, V & Wilkinson, P. 1998. Housing provision in metropolitan Cape 
Town: An exploration of strategic and institutional issues. Urban Problems Research Unit, 











municipalities needed to be reviewed in order to redress the inherited 
imbalances 10. 
The Western Cape's housing situation was complicated. Behrens et al (1998) 
suggested that you could not put the housing problem in South Africa and in 
particular the Western Cape, simply down to a discrepancy between the level 
of demand and the level of supply 11. The issue they argued was far more 
complex than this. Those responsible for housing delivery would have to 
grapple with the various issues linked to housing if any success was to be 
achieved. 
There are a number of related issues that must be understood in order to put 
the Western Cape's housing crisis into context. Firstly, there were very strong 
coloured and black racial tensions in the region. This was due to the apartheid 
governments 'preferential' treatment of coloured and Asiatic minorities. 
Secondly, the Western Cape was encountering a large influx of people from 
the Eastern Cape, seeking employment opportunities, access to education 
and health. Thirdly, issues relating to violence, drugs and alcohol abuse were 
imbedded in many of the communities. Lastly, the issue of existing waiting 
lists for houses was a critical one that needed to be addressed as the 
government was under pressure to decide who to give houses or housing 
10 South Africa Survey 1995/1996. 1996. Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race 
Relations, pp. 321-363. 
11 Behrens, R & Watson, V & Wilkinson, P. 1998. Housing provision in metropolitan Cape 
Town: An exploration of strategic and institutional issues. Urban Problems Research Unit, 











subsidies to 12. The majority of individuals on housing waiting lists were people 
classified as coloured. No lists were kept of people wanting accommodation in 
the informal settlements or newer townships, that had been established in 
Cape Town from the 1980's and in particular those established post the 
removal of influx control regulations. The people excluded from the lists and 
wanting houses were overwhelmingly African 13. 
All the afore mentioned issues made the housing question in the Western 
Cape far more than just an issue around the concept of demand and supply. 
This presented local, provincial and national government with a particular 
political problem in respect of the Western Cape and Cape Town in particular. 
The following section will discuss how the government approached this 
complex housing problem, which it inherited from the apartheid administration. 
1.2 South Africa's post-apartheid housing policy 
The newly elected South African government was determined to bring about 
change and the vehicle they used to drive this change was the Reconstruction 
and Development Program (RDP). The architects of the Reconstruction and 
Development Program recognized that the housing problem in South Africa 
had reached 'crisis proportions,14. Plans for a housing policy were thus put 
together within the Reconstruction and Development Programme. 
12 Asmal, K. 2000. Ethnicity and Housing. Part Two: South Africa. Vermont, Ashgate 
Publishing Company, pp. 27-34. 
13 Simons, M. 2007. Interview Material. Interview conducted on 10 May. 
14 The Reconstruction and Development Programme. 1994. Johannesburg, Umanyano 











The National Housing Forum (NHF) was officially launched on 31 August 
1992, with a mandate to develop a housing policy and framework. The NHF 
was made up of 19 members from; political groups, parastatal agencies, 
representatives of financial services, construction and insurance sectors and 
NGO's. The Forum was funded by the Independent Development Trust. All 
parties were encouraged to set aside political differences and work together to 
develop a new plan for social housing in South Africa. The forum developed 
the White Paper on Housing in 199415. 
The goal and contents of the White Paper were clear. A summary of the key 
aspects of the White Paper are provided below16. This is followed by an 
evaluation of the implementation of the Housing policy and finally an overall 
critique of the policy and implementation. 
The Housing White Paper cut ties with the previous regime's strategy of 
housing delivery and adopted an entirely new approach to housing in South 
Africa. It put forward for the first time, a coherent national housing strategy, 
which removed multiple institutions that had been responsible for housing 
delivery in the past. The primary goal of the White Paper was to produce 1 
million low cost houses over 5 years. These units would be specifically 
intended for 'low-income households and were to include the rural areas'17. 
15 Khan, F & Thring, P. 2003. Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Sandown, Heinemann Publishers (Pty) Ltd. pp. 1-132. 
16 Department of Housing, 1994. White Paper - A New Housing Policy and Strategy for South 
Africa. pp. 1-57. 
17 The Reconstruction and Development Programme. 1994. Johannesburg, Umanyano 











The houses would be delivered according to a new capital housing subsidy 
system 18. Two other major goals of the White Paper were to increase the 
Department of Housing's share of the state budget to 5%, together with 
increasing housing delivery to a peak of 338 000 houses per annum after 5 
years 19. 
Although the new constitution had not been drawn up yet, the ANC made it 
clear that South Africans had the right to housing and one of the White 
Paper's first priorities was to provide for the homeless. The needs of the poor 
and vulnerable groups (women, youth and the disabled) would also be 
prioritized, according to the White Paper. The new housing strategy included 
policies, which would allow for the development of small, medium-sized and 
micro enterprises (SMME's) that would be owned and run by black people2o. 
The government was ultimately responsible for ensuring that housing be 
provided for all South Africans. The Mandela government, however, made it 
clear that it would not engage directly in the provision of housing but would 
create an 'enabling' environment for housing delivery. The government would 
thus facilitate housing delivery and the construction would be market-driven21 . 
18 Gilbert, A. 2001. 'Scan Globally; Reinvent Locally': Reflecting on the Origins of South 
Africa's Capital Housing Subsidy Policy. In Urban Studies, Vol. 39, No.1 O. Carfax Publishing, 
pp. 1911-1933. 
19Bond, P. 2000. The Housing Question. In Elite Transition - From Apartheid to Neoliberalism 
in South Africa. Scottsville, University of Natal Press. pp. 143. 
20 Khan, F & Thring, P. 2003. Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Sandown, Heinemann Publishers (Pty) Ltd, pp. 1-132. 
21 The Reconstruction and Development Programme. 1994. Johannesburg, Umanyano 











The Housing White Paper described the new housing policy as having an 
'incremental' approach to housing delivery in South Africa. This 'incremental' 
approach was clearly displayed in its projected budget allocations. The 
government was 'to allocate subsidy funds from the budget - to reach a goal 
of not less than five per cent of the national budget by the end of the five year 
RDP,22. 
Construction costs for social housing were to be kept to a minimum without 
sacrificing quality and emphasis was also placed on using local resources. 
The White Paper declared that minimum housing standards had to be met, 
... all housing must provide protection from the weather, a durable 
structure. A house must include sanitary facilities, storm-water drainage, 
a household energy supply and convenient access to clean wate?3. 
In conclusion the new housing strategy promoted, 
... establishing viable, socially and economically integrated communities 
in areas allowing convenient access to economic opportunities as well 
as health, educational, social amenities and transport infrastructure, 
within which all South Africans will have access, on a progressive basis, 
to a permanent residential structure with secure tenure24 . 
22 Bond, P. 2000. The Housing Question. In Elite Transition - From Apartheid to 
Neoliberalism in South Africa. Scottsville, University of Natal Press, pp. 122-151. 
23 The Reconstruction and Development Programme. 1994. Johannesburg, Umanyano 
Publications. pp. 23. 
24 Khan, F & Thring, P. 2003. Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 











1.3 A Critique of the post-apartheid housing policy 
The housing policy devised by the new South African government received 
considerable attention by housing experts and political officials. The ANC 
regime was under considerable pressure to produce results when they 
assumed power, as housing was a critical issue because it was one that 
directly affected the majority of South Africans25. Much has been written about 
the performance of the housing sector but before this paper investigates the 
criticisms of the new housing policy and its performance, it is vital that the 
results are unpacked. 
25 Turok, I & Watson, V. 2001. Divergent Development in South African Cities: Strategic 











The new ANC government was under pressure to produce houses due to the 
following backlog figures that existed in 1994. 
Table 1: Provincial Distribution of Housing Backlog (1994)26 
Province Backlog 
Eastern Ca~e 715 726 
Free State 261 520 
Gauteng 671 705 
Kwazulu-Natal 850082 
Mpumalanga 191 779 
Northern Cape 16607 
Limpopo 533704 
North West 339402 
Western Cape 162 371 
TOTAL 3742896 
26 Khan, F & Thring, P. 2003. Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 











The ANC was able to build over 1.7 million houses in 12 years. According to 
Kecia Rust, the rate at which South Africa delivered these units was 
'unparalleled internationally,27. The breakdown of this delivery is given below. 




Eastern Cape 247683 
Free State 117 135 
Gauteng 404610 
Kwazulu-Natal 308040 
Mpumalanga 140 511 
Northern Cape 36293 
Limpopo 138458 
North West 141 216 
Western Cape 210118 
TOTAL 1 744064 
27 Rust, K. 2006. Analysis of South Africa's Housing Sector Performance - Fin Mark Trust. 
http://www.finmarktrust.org.za/docu ments/2007 /March/Hsectoranalysis. pdf Website accessed 
on 14 May 2007. pp. 7. 












In order to solve the housing crisis a great deal of money needed to be spent 
on housing delivery. According to most housing experts, it was important that 
a good percentage of the South African national budget was dedicated 
towards housing29 . The expenditure figures are given below. 




Year expenditure expenditure 
as a % of 
(R millions) (R millions) 
National 
expenditure 
1995\96 987 151 829 0.7 
1996\97 2070 176291 1.2 
1997\98 4520 189947 2.4 
1998\98 3748 201 416 1.9 
1999\00 3494 214 749 1.6 
2000\01 3433 235048 1.5 
2001\02 3718 258318 1.4 
From the figures it is clear that the new housing policy did produce a 
considerable amount of houses between 1994 and 2005. Not enough houses, 
however, were built to address the national backlog31 . The national backlog in 
1994 was over 3.7 million and by 2005, only 1.7 million houses had been 
constructed or were being constructed. This meant that almost 2 million 
29 Behrens, R & Watson, V & Wilkinson, P. 1998. Housing provision in metropolitan Cape 
Town: An exploration of strategic and institutional issues. Urban Problems Research Unit, 
University of Cape Town, pp.1-51. 
30 Khan, F & Thring, P. 2003. Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Sandown, Heinemann Publishers (Pty) Ltd, pp.169 











houses sti ll had to be bUilt without taking into consideration the new entrants 
into the housing market which by 2003, had reached 200 000 new fami lies a 
year02 This therefore mea nt that hou sing demand was outstripping the supply 
of houses. The 110using problem had therefore cont inued to worsen after 
1994. 
The susta inability and quality of the houses that were delivered also resulted 
In some major crit icism . Th is is high lig hted by the fact that by 2001, 49 809 
hOUSing units had been registered with the Defects Warranty Scheme 
Another disturbing stat istic that also came about in 1999 was that 'on ly 30% of 
houses compl ied with the standard size of 30m,m, 
Illustration 1: A Typical Two_room RDP House34 
"Soulh Afrk:a SUf~ey 2C<J412C<J5. Johar.nesburg, South Alrtcan Institute 01 Race Relat~ns, 
pp 383·457 
" Khan. F & Thmg. P. 2C<J3. Housing PoliC)' and Practice ir Post-Apartheid South Alrica 
Sandowr., Heinemann Publlshars (Pt)':, Ltd, pp. 1-132 
"Typical twc-rGcm RDP Hou sa "",wallordablehousmgirstitute. orgiblogs.lusi2 :Online:. :5;je 











Patrick Bond was highly critical of the post-apartheid housing policy. 
What with South Africa's formidable legacy of social struggles over 
urban shelter issues, more was expected of the first democratic 
government's housing policy, and less was delivered, than in practically 
any other area of social policY5. 
Housing experts have given various reasons as to why the housing policy 
under-performed, as Bond and the statistics have suggested, and this paper 
will outline a number of arguments by key authors. 
The World Bank argued that the South African Government funding policy and 
budget allocation was largely to blame for the lack of delivery. According to 
the World Bank, too little of the national budget was spent on housing. In 
2001/02 only 1.4% of South Africa's national budget was allocated to housing. 
According to the World Bank, South Africa needed to allocate 7-8% of their 
annual GOP to housing. Countries with similar levels of economic 
development spend around 5% of their budget on housing but South Africa 
needed to increase this to compensate for the lower than average allocations 
in the pase6 . The World Bank also suggested that the new South African 
government could have learned from the housing policies adopted in other 
countries, such as Chile and this could have prevented some of the problems 
the new government experienced37 . 
35 Bond, P. 2000. The Housing Question. In Elite Transition - From Apartheid to 
Neoliberalism in South Africa. Scottsville, University of Natal Press. pp. 122. 
36 Behrens, R & Watson, V & Wilkinson, P. 1998. Housing provision in metropolitan Cape 
Town: An exploration of strategic and institutional issues. Urban Problems Research Unit, 











Thring and Khan argue that the housing policy instituted by the ANC 
government was flawed and this has thus resulted in the poor performance of 
the housing sector. They argue that the policy was supply-driven and not 
based on the needs of the people and for these reasons the housing policy 
did not perform. Communities were not involved in many of the planning 
stages of projects, which thus created a divide between developers' promises 
and community expectations. They suggest that the housing policy was an 
'extension' of the pre-democratic approach to housing in South Africa, as it did 
not take into account the transitional nature of the South African society at the 
Gear (1999) argues that research during the 1990's showed that housing 
delivery in many instances, undermined people's access to economic 
opportunities, which was in direct contrast to the aims of the South African 
housing pOlicl9 . This consequently meant that the beneficiaries did not see 
their newly acquired houses as assets. To date, it has been reported that 50-
60 percent of RDP houses have changed hands, some being sold for as little 
as R 1500. The in itial beneficiaries of these houses were not satisfied with 
being moved to areas which lacked economic opportunity. They thus rented or 
sold their RDP house and moved back to the areas where they came from. 
This movement back had numerous knock on effects as it reunited families, 
37 Gilbert, A. 2001. 'Scan Globally; Reinvent Locally': Reflecting on the Origins of South 
Africa's Capital Housing Subsidy Policy. In Urban Studies, Vol. 39, No.1 O. Carfax Publishing, 
pp. 1911-1933. 
38 Khan, F & Thring, P. 2003. Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Sandown, Heinemann Publishers (Pty) Ltd, pp. 120. 
39 Gear, S. 1999. Issues in Development, No. 18 - Numbers or Neighbourhoods: are the 
beneficiaries of government subsidized housing provision economically empowered? 











cut down on transport costs to work and allowed children to continue studying 
at their previous school4o. 
Thring and Khan have identified specific reasons as to why the housing policy 
did not achieve the goals that is set out in the Housing White Paper of 1994. 
Firstly, 80% of the money allocated for housing went unspent between 1994 -
1996. Secondly, in 1998-99 only 1.5% of the state budget was set aside for 
housing - a lower percentage than during the apartheid era. Added to this 
inadequate budgeting, there was an unequal distribution of funding amongst 
low-income groups. The reason for this was that higher income groups 
became the target for private housing projects, as it was easier for them to 
gain access to credit. Thirdly, many of the geographical locations of the new 
housing projects were undesirable and did not meet the objectives laid out by 
the RDP. Many existed quite some distances from major centres thus cutting 
off access to job opportunities. Some housing projects also did not have 
access to schools, clinics or shopping facilities. Fourthly, very few housing 
projects were developed in conflict-ridden townships where development 
projects were often needed the most. Finally, corruption within provincial 
housing departments meant that money was being laundered and not spent 
where it was needed41 . 
The Government believed that although many successes were seen with the 
post-apartheid housing policy, it did not adequately address the inherited 
40 Bregman, M. & Snyman, J. 2007. Interview Material. Interview conducted on May 4. 
41 Khan, F & Thring, P. 2003. Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 











apartheid inequalities in South Africa. The government believed that a 'new 
plan was required to redirect and enhance existing mechanisms to move 
towards a more responsive and effective delivery,42. 
1.4 'Breaking New Ground' - South Africa's New Housing 
Policy 
The 'Breaking New Ground' Plan is, according to the government, a break 
from the trend of housing policies that have gone before and represents a new 
vision for housing development in South Africa. It is a 'step forward' according 
to those involved in the policy making and it follows the international trend in 
social housing43 . The crux of the new policy is that housing is no longer seen 
'in terms of shelter but of sustainable and integrated human settlements,44. 
Previous housing policies in South Africa have focused purely on home 
ownership on a one-plot-one-house basis. This has not worked according to 
officials and has only led to the continuation of urban sprawl. Communities in 
new housing projects are continually marginalized due to the lack of proper 
foresight and planning. Many housing developments have actually served to 
exclude residents from economic and social opportunities. The 'Breaking New 
42 Breaking New Ground. 2004. A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable 
Human Settlements. Department of Housing, pp. 7. 
43 Department of Local Government and Housing. 2005. Five-year Strategic and Performance 
Plan 2005 to 2009. pp. 7-43. 
44 Human Settlements Reference Group. 2005. Draft Discussion Document to inform the 
development of a Strategy and Implementation Plan in the Western Cape for 'Breaking New 
Ground': A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements. 











Ground' Plan aims to break away from this pattern and develop sustainable 
communities45. 
The fundamental aim of the new strategy is to bring about 'Sustainable 
Human Settlements'. These, according to policy documents are, 
well-managed entities in which economic growth and social development 
are in balance with the carrying capacity of the natural systems on which 
they depend for their existence and result in sustainable development, 
wealth creation, poverty alleviation and equitl6. 
The new human settlement plan aims to move beyond merely providing basic 
shelters and is focused on creating sustainable communities. In theory this is 
an important step forward in South Africa's housing policy but the success of 
this new policy will be determined by what is done in practice. Through the N2 
Gateway example, this paper will show the achievements of this new policy47. 
The BNG strategy wants to redirect and enhance existing mechanisms to 
achieve more responsive and effective housing delivery48. A key feature of the 
strategy will be to enhance the role of the private sector. The government 
aims to create public-private partnerships to aid construction and to allow for 
45 Rust, K. 2006. Analysis of South Africa's Housing Sector Performance - Fin Mark Trust. 
http://www.finmarktrust.org.za/documents/2007/March/Hsectoranalysis. pdf Website accessed 
on 14 May 2007. pp. 1-44 
46 Breaking New Ground. 2004. A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable 
Human Settlements. Department of Housing, pp. 11. 
47 Rust, K. 2006. Analysis of South Africa's Housing Sector Performance - Fin Mark Trust. 
http://www.finmarktrust.org.za/documents/2007/March/Hsectoranalysis. pdf Website accessed 
on 14 May 2007. pp. 1-44. 
48 Chuene, T. 2006. Delivering on housing mandate. In New Homes: Buying, Building, 
Renovating and Inspiring. Issue 4. Edited by Doolan, J. Randburg, Mafube Publishing (Pty) 











the provision of housing finance. The government believes that public-private 
partnerships will be the key to ensuring higher delivery rates49 . The BNG 
Policy document outlines clear objectives for housing in South Africa and 
these are included in the Appendix A5o. 
It is important to note that the BNG policy document (2004) and the Housing 
White Paper from 1994 are exceedingly similar in content. 
Housing White Paper (1994): 
.. . government strives to establish viable, socially and economically 
integrated communities, situated in areas allowing convenient access to 
economic opportunities as well as health, educational and social 
amenities, within which all South Africans will have access, on a 
progressive basis, to a permanent residential structure with secure 
tenure51 . 
BNG Policy (2004): 
.. . to create sustainable human settlements... in safe and secure 
environments with adequate access to economic opportunities, a mix of 
safe and secure housing and tenure types, reliable basic services and 
educational, entertainment, cultural, health, welfare and police 
services52. 
49 Sisulu, L 2006. 200612007 Budget Vote Statement. [Media Briefing, May 24). Cape Town. 
50 Breaking New Ground. 2004. A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable 
Human Settlements. Department of Housing. 
51 Khan, F & Thring, P. 2003. Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Sandown, Heinemann Publishers (Pty) Ltd, pp. 121. 
52 Human Settlements Reference Group. 2005. Draft Discussion Document to inform the 
development of a Strategy and Implementation Plan in the Western Cape for 'Breaking New 
Ground': A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements. 











The similarity in these documents is concerning to many housing experts. The 
government has stressed the BNG policy is a break from past housing 
strategies but clearly from the above quotations very little has changed with 
regards to South Africa's housing policy. The proof will be in the actual 
practice of the policy and this paper will uncover the results with regards to 












The N2 Gateway Project 
2.1 Purpose of the Project 
The N2 Gateway Project is the product of the government's new 'Breaking 
New Ground' policy, which aims to bring about the development of 
sustainable human settlements. It is the lead pilot project of a series of pilots 
to be implemented in all provinces around the country53. 
The purpose of the N2 Gateway is to comprehensively address the 
housing and development needs of communities located in the targeted 
areas in such a way that individual and household livelihoods are 
enhanced; people are housed in habitable, affordable and sustainable 
housing; the city is improved through urban renewal, regeneration, and 
socio economic development; and, the institutional capacity necessary to 
address wider upgrading needs is assembled. This project triggers and 
complements other initiatives at restructuring the spatial economy of the 
city so that its benefits are more equitably distributeif4 
The N2 Gateway project aims to upgrade the informal settlements, which exist 
along the N2, from the Borcherds Quarry Drive (located near the Cape Town 
International Airport) to Bunga Avenue in Langa. The project also includes 
development initiatives in District 6. The project intends to produce roughly 25 
000 homes for those living in these areas55. All in all, around 100 000 people 
will be housed through this initiative56 . Due to the project's pilot status, it is a 
53 Integrated Development Plan 2005/2006. 2006. Chapter 4: Creating Integrated 
Settlements. 
54 N2 Gateway Project: Overview. 2004. PowerPoint Presentation, pp. 1-40. 
55 Department of Local Government and Housing: 5 Year Strategic and Performance Plan, 
2005. pp. 8. 











scaled intervention that is geographically limited to the areas alongside the N2 
highway. 
At the present moment the N2 Gateway consists of ten 'projects' (8 currently 
being implemented). Each project has its own time frame and particular 
combination of 'walkup' (rental) and 'BNG' (subsidy) housing units. The 
breakdown of the housing components in each area of the project is displayed 











Table 4: N2 Gateway Components 26 September 200657 
BNG Houses Walkups Total 
Joe Siovo Phase 1 0 705 705 
Joe Siovo Phase 2 1000 0 1000 
Joe Siovo Phase 3 464 0 464 
Delft 7-9 3710 795 4505 
Delft Symphony 6242 600 6842 
New Rest 1154 0 1154 
Boystown 1508 0 1508 
District Six 500 0 500 
Blue Down Erf 1892 1800 200 2000 
Wingfield 6800 272 7072 
Total 23178 2572 25750 
The initiative is significant not only as a pilot project of the Breaking New 
Ground, but also in the explicit engagement of three levels of government, the 
city of Cape Town, the provincial government and national department of 
Housing. A memorandum of understanding was signed by all three tiers of 
57 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 











government in February 2005 and a steering committee involving members 
from all three bodies was setup58. 
The major focus for the development is the introduction of an integrated 
approach to housing, whereby the new residents will 'have access to 
community facilities, social amenities and new economic opportunities,59. It is 
hoped that through the knowledge gained from the implementation of this 
project, further projects will be successfully rolled out in order to 'eradicate 
informal settlements by 2014,60. 
2.2 Why was Cape Town chosen? 
Cape Town was selected as the site for the pilot project because of the range 
of problems and opportunities it presented. Cape Town's housing backlog, its 
rapid rate of urbanization, and in particular its very poor housing delivery rates 
in the last decade, are some of its particular problems. The political 
dimensions of these problems are significant in respect of the sometimes 
competing claims of informal settlement dwellers and backyard shack 
dwellers. Cape Town's expanding economy and economic opportunities could 
aid the process of solving the aforementioned problems and therefore the city 
was chosen as the site for the BNG pilot project. It is hoped that through the 
implementation of the project, many lessons would be learnt and the 
58 N2 Gateway. 2006. Housing Strategy Committee. [PowerPoint Presentation] June 26. 
59 City of Cape Town, Integrated Development Plan 2005/2006. 











knowledge gained from the experience will be used in the implementation of 
future housing initiatives across South Africa61 . 
The N2 site was chosen according to certain 'criteria'. Firstly, it was decided 
that a high-density centrally located informal settlement was needed due to 
the large scale of the intended project. Secondly, they wished the project to 
address the needs of areas where the extent of poverty and the inadequacy of 
shelter was the greatest. Thirdly, the area also needed to have had a history 
of poor social service delivery. With these criteria in mind, they identified a 
number of informal settlements, for example Joe Siovo, New Rest, Boystown 
that could be developed and thus the N2 site was chosen. 
The N2 location was an area that possessed all the crucial characteristics of a 
site that was in dire need of a housing development initiative. The people 
living in the 'N2 area' were also living with the continual threat of fire, flooding 
and crime, which made the intervention even more necessary62. 
61 Briefing document for the N2 Gateway Project. 2006. [Part of media pack handed out at the 
official launch of Phase 2 of the N2 Gateway Project]. 
62 Mfeketo, N. 2005. N2 Gateway Briefing Document. [Minister of Housing Briefing on 











Illustration 2: N2 Gateway - Project Area" 
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2.3 The Vision of the Intervention 
The N2 Gateway Project has numerous aspects to it. Firstly, it aims to bring 
about the improvement in the quality of people's lives through the provision of 
basic services in the areas identified. This is a continuation of the 1994 
National housing policl4 . Secondly, the project will bring about the 
development of the infrastructure and settlement design needed to produce 
integrated settlements. These settlements will be carefully planned so as not 
to disrupt 'the delicate socio-economic fabric underpinning the livelihood and 
coping strategies of the poor,65. Thirdly, the project aims to re-establish 
communities that have been displaced by de-densification. An example of this 
is the fact that documents of beneficiaries (e.g. medical records) will have to 
be transferred to institutions that are closer to the site of the new housing 
development66. This is intended to minimize the disruption for people in the 
relocation process from one settlement to another. The knowledge gained 
through this procedure will be used in later developments. Fourthly, it aims to 
give those living in unsuitable areas access to economic opportunities and 
community facilities. Lastly, the project will 'design and deliver products that 
offer tenure diversification (rental, rent to own, mortgage homes, BNG 
64 Department of Housing, 1994. White Paper - A New Housing Policy and Strategy for South 
Africa. pp. 1-57. 
65 Briefing Document for the N2 Gateway Project, 2005. A Joint Initiative of the National 
Department of Housing, the Western Cape Department of Housing and the City of Cape 
Town. 
66 Baker, K. 2007. Interview Material. [Interview conducted on 8 May at the Wimpy in 
Somerset West]. 











2.4 The Cost of the N2 Gateway Project 
The cost of the Gateway initiative has been a highly controversial and topical 
issue due to the fact that the costing of the project has continually been 
changing68 . The figures in the most recent Business Plan (26 September 
2006) give a project cost of R3, 418 billion and the breakdown of this cost is 
displayed in Table 5 on the following page. 











Table 5: N2 Gateway Budget 26 September 200669 
Element Number of Units 
Housing Component 
BNG top structures 23178 




NHBRC Registration 23178 
Bulk and Link Infrastructure 
Link Transport, Water and Sanitation Services 
Bulk and Link Infrastructure to new Projects 
Electrical Bulk supply to Projects 
Electrical reticulation within Projects 
TRA's 
Maintenance of TRA's 6793 
Dismantling of TRA's 6793 
Social and Economic Infrastructure 
COCT (parks, gardens, facilities, etc.) 
PGWC (schools, clinics, etc) 
Communications & Community Participation 
TOTAL 
69 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 




























2.5 The make up of the N2 Gateway 
Initially the intention was that the N2 Gateway would build 22 000 housing 
units70 Subsequently, the number of housing units was increased to 25 750 
The allocation of between BNG top structures (houses) to walk ups (rental 
units) is 90:10 The walk-ups vary between one and three bed roomed units, 
while the majority of the BNG are two-bed roomed units. The cost of a BNG 
top structure is R 54 966 and the estimated cost of a single walkup unit is R 
r _______ GraPh 1: N2 Gateway Housing Typologies 
DHouse~ __ .,!'{alk_-upS I 
2572 
23178 
'" Sisulu, L 2000 , 200612007 Badget Vote Statement. :Mecia Brieling, May 2.!] Cape Town 
, 
N2 Gateway BUsiness P:an Septemoer 2000' Draft 6 2000. Upcated, amenced and 










2.6 Time-Frames for N2 Gateway 
The Gateway Project has not been able to meet its intended deadlines72 , as 
the project has suffered numerous problems and delays. These issues will be 
investigated in the following chapters. 
Table 6: N2 Gateway Timeline73 
DATE ACTION 
August 2004 National Cabinet Meeting - Gateway plan 
set in motion 
December 2004 Cyberia appointed as project manager 
February 2005 MOU signed between all three tiers of 
government 
June 2005 1st Deadline for N2 Gateway delivery 
December 2005 2nd Deadline for N2 Gateway delivery 
January 2006 - Cyberia's services terminated 
- City replaced as developer by 
Province 
- Province appoints Thubelisha 
June 2006 Phase 1 completed (Joe Siovo - 705 units) 
December 2006 3rd Deadline for N2 Gateway delivery 
March 2010 Latest Deadline for N2 Gateway delivery 
72 Pollack, M. 2005. N2 Gateway taking shape. [Online]. Available: http://www.housing.gov.za 
[2006, October 1]. 
73 The timeline was initially devised by Paul Blake through the documentation available. 











The delivery of housing units has been broken up over five years and the 
delivery schedule is graphed below74. 












74 Information for the graph obtained from the N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: 












Major Problems with the N2 Gateway 
3.1 Broken Promises 
One of the features of the N2 Gateway initiative, which became problematic, 
was the 'promise of housing' that was made to the people. In 2005, at the start 
of the project the people of Cape Town were informed that the plan was to 
build '22 000 homes in six months,75. Nomaindia Mfeketo, at a Housing media 
event in February 2005, stated that the 'project will be successfully 
implemented in a rapid phased and responsible manner. It will bring huge 
benefits to all the poor and deprived of Cape Town,.76 Mrs Mfeketo also 
promised that 'everything is now in place - the money, the business plan and 
the contractors - to make this reality,77. These statements pleased possible 
beneficiaries as many had been waiting for a number of decades for the 
government to deliver on previous housing promises. 
Cynthia Bokwe's (a prospective new Gateway resident) comments typifies this 
expectation discussed above - 'I am very happy, excited and thankful I have 
this opportunity. We will live under better circumstances,78. In retrospect, 
75 Urban Resource Centre, 2005. N2 Corridor - Cape Town. Cape Town, The Community 
Organisation Urban Resource Centre. 
76 Mfeketo, N. 2005. N2 Gateway Briefing Document. [Minister of Housing Briefing on 
Housing Media Event]. February 14. 
77 Engineering News. 2005. 'Hopelessly Flawed'? - Local professionals describe Cape Town 
planning as 'expensive joke'. November, pp. 11-17. 












however, it was clear that this goal was virtually impossible to achieve as the 
government did not have adequate resources and planning in place at the 
time. The contract companies had warned the politiCians at the time that the 
'contract period is unfeasibly shorf79 . Within a few months it was clear that 
the Department of Housing's aim of building 22 000 houses by June 2005 was 
not going to be achieved. 
The time frames of the N2 Gateway were revised despite the remarkable 
comments made by Minister Sisulu in August 2005, 'I'm proud of what we 
have produced in the shortest time possible. We are meeting deadlines under 
difficult circumstances'. 80 
The policy document was amended and the new time schedule showed that 
the Gateway Project would be completed by June 200681 . This angered the 
people of Cape Town, as now prospective beneficiaries would have to wait 
another year before receiving a home. This feeling is captured in Mzonki 
Poni's, an informal N2 settlement resident, comment on the housing situation. 
He said, 'We are tired of promises, we want houses as much as you want our 
votes,82. The bottom line of the situation was that the unrealistic aspirations of 
the politicians did not match the work that could be achieved on the ground 
level. The politicians involved with the project needed to ensure that the 
79 Winfield, M. 2006. A Living Space for All. The Political Vision, Delivery Mechanisms and 
Social Needs influencing the N2 Gateway Project, pp. 4. 
80 Cape Argus. First N2 Gateway Homes Completed. 2005. August 24. 
81 Kipps, S. 2005. N2 Gateway Project - Record of Meeting held between the City, PMU and 
Vula Joint Venture on 14 November 2005. [Document written by Vula Joint Venture]. 











delivery mechanisms that were in place could achieve the objectives of their 
vision, and this was not the case. 
Within months of the new deadline being set it was clear from the lack of 
construction on the prospective housing sites that the three tiers of 
government would once again not deliver on their promises83 . The City of 
Cape Town, the Provincial Government and the Department of Housing were 
experiencing difficulties with regards to funding (as explained in Chapter 5.2 of 
this paper) amongst other things, and soon the deadline for the Gateway was 
extended again to December 200684 . Richard Dyantyi, the MEC for Local 
Government and Housing, however assured the public at the time that the N2 
Gateway was 'on track' and that those responsible for the project had 
'exceeded expectations,85. It was difficult for the public to digest his 
comments. The project had now been extended by a year and a half. 
Phase 1 of the N2 Gateway project was finally completed in June 2006. The 
first phase incorporated various projects including infrastructure development 
and the establishment of Transitional Relocation Areas (TRA's - temporary 
houses). Only 705 housing units were, however, delivered in Phase One. 
According to the 'Briefing Document' that was given to those who attended the 
ceremony to celebrate the completion of Phase One, the housing officials 
83 Kipps, S. 2005. N2 Gateway Project - Record of Meeting held between the City, PMU and 
Vula Joint Venture on 14 November 2005. [Document written by Vula Joint Venture]. 
84 Audit Committee Meeting, City of Cape Town, 2005. N2 Gateway. AUD 16A106/05. 
85 Powell, A. 2006. Problems dog Gateway, but officials say project is 'on track'. In Cape 











responsible for the N2 Gateway had evaluated the lessons learned from 
Phase One and were ready to accelerate the implementation process. Those 
who spoke at the ceremony made it clear that the problems experienced in 
Phase One had been ironed out and that the future of the N2 Gateway was 
On the 31 st December 2006 (the deadline for the project), only the 705 walk-
up units had been completed. This effectively meant that after the project had 
been extended by over a year and a half, with the new deadline set for 
December 2006, only 3.2% of the Gateway initiative had been completed. The 
promises made by the politicians to the people of Cape Town had thus been 
broken. The N2 Gateway had simply not delivered on its promises. The latest 
available information shows that the N2 Gateway is now to be completed in 
March 201087. This date is four years and nine months after the initial delivery 
deadline. 
The reasons for the 'broken promises' have been argued by many housing 
experts. Two common theories that are put forward are firstly, that housing 
officials were poorly advised and secondly, politicians were trying to secure 
support through making grand political statements (the local elections were 
taking place at the time)88. 
86 Briefing document for the N2 Gateway Project. 2006. [Part of media pack handed out at the 
official launch of Phase 2 of the N2 Gateway Project]. 
87 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 
submitted by Thubelisha Homes, pp. 1-56. 











Although the N2 Gateway project is a pilot project and errors and delays were 
expected, it seems unforgivable how politicians continued to make and break 
promises to the public. The government was developing a new strategy that 
had never been tested before. It would have made sense to put forward 
conservative objectives and time-frames, but the politicians in charge chose 
not to do this, as many believed (often through bad advice) that extra-ordinary 
results could be achieved. According to Peter Oscroft the problem lay with the 
immense size of the initiative, 'a pilot should be at a small scale - a project of 
some R3.2 billion is not really a pilot project!' 89 If a smaller project had been 
planned there would have been fewer exaggerated promises. 
The housing crisis in the Western Cape is severe and drastic action is 
needed. A conservative mindset and incremental processes were however 
needed when the planning for the N2 gateway began. This would have 
allowed problems to be sorted out more easily and better results would have 
been seen, without the need for making grand promises to the public. There 
was a drastic need for houses due to the major backlog and politicians wanted 
to address this issue, but a balance needed to be found9o . 
The promises made by politicians didn't only extend to the deadlines for 
delivery of the N2 Gateway units. Promises over rental prices for the first 
phase of the project were also broken. The public was informed that the rental 
for the walkup units in the new Joe Siovo settlement 'would be between R165 
890scroft, Peter (Peter.Oscroft@capetown.gov.za) 2006. Masters Thesis. [Personal email, 31 
October] to Paul Blake (blkpau002@mail.uct.ac.za). 











and R200 for small flats and R690 for larger units,91. The rental figures have, 
however, increased, putting an added burden on those living in the settlement. 
In some instances, residents are now required to pay over a R1000 a month 
in rental92 . The reason for this increase was because the construction costs 
for the units were greater than expected and thus in order to fill this financial 
gap, the rents had to be raised93 . 
The Joe Siovo residents who were moved to Delft in order for the first phase 
of the N2 Gateway to be developed were also victims of failed promises. 
According to reports, they were informed that they would be relocated as soon 
as the construction was finished on the Joe Siovo site. When construction was 
completed many of the residents did not return to Joe Siovo. They either could 
not afford the rents or were reportedly placed lower down the waiting list94 . 
Many residents have thus had to remain in Delft and are unhappy with their 
new living conditions. Kwanele Giyama, a 'temporary resident' in Delft, said 
You see, in these houses, when it's cold it gets really cold and it's hot it 
gets really hot. It's bad. We arrived here in June. There was no time 
plan, they just promised us they would move us when our houses are 
complete95 . 
91 Hawker, D. 2006. Gateway integration. In Cape Argus. June 24. 
92 Nzapheza, V. 2007. Dyantyi promises to fix Gateway houses. In Cape Times April 16. 
93 Baker, K. 2007. Interview Material. [Interview conducted on 25 May at the Wimpy in 
Somerset West]. 
94 Engineering News. 2005. Local professionals describe N2 Gateway as 'expensive joke'. 
[Online] http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article [Site accessed on 18 May 2007]. 











In conclusion, the promises made by politicians have created serious 
problems for the Gateway project. It broke the trust between the public and 
those responsible for delivering the N2 Gateway project. This 'trust' is critical 
according to development experts96 . Communities need to be supportive of 
development projects if they are to be successful and the N2 Gateway 
initiative took a step 'backwards' when this trust was broken. 
3.2 Financing the N2 Gateway 
A great deal of controversy has surrounded the funding of the N2 Gateway. 
Newspaper headlines such as 'Fears over N2 Gateway project funding F.J7 , 
'City admits Gateway cash crunchF.J8 and 'No guarantee on N2 Gateway 
funds F.J9 have meant there has been a great deal of speculation around the 
financing of the project. 
3.2.1 The National Housing Subsidy System and the N2 Gateway 
The slow progress of the N2 Gateway delivery has been due to many 
problems, one of the most important being the financial dilemma of the 
initiative. The first issue relating to the financial predicament has been the 
linking of the national housing subsidy system with the N2 Gateway project. 
96 Gittel, R & Videl, A. 1998. Community Organizing - Building Social Capital as a 
Development Strategy. Sage Publications, pp. 14-22. 
97 Dolley, C & Powell, A. Fears over N2 Gateway project funding. In Cape Times [date 
unknown]. 
98 Powell, A. 2005. City admits Gateway cash crunch. In Cape Times, December 6. 











The N2 Gateway project is a new initiative that is building houses (as well as 
community facilities) that are more expensive than the houses built in prior 
housing initiatives. This has necessitated an increase in the subsidy amount. 
However, the subsidy increase allocated for N2 Gateway initiative does not 
cover the cost of the new Breaking New Ground house 100. This has meant 
that not enough money has been set aside to build the new homes. According 
to Peter Oscroft, the City Council's Project Manager, 
There was a total mis-alignment of existing policy with expectations for 
the finished product, which meant that the level of subsidy was totally 
inadequate for the house types expected101 . 
What this effectively meant was that the houses that were being built in the N2 
Gateway were too costly for what the government had provided for. The 
government had thus made a fundamental error by aligning the existing 
subsidy policy with the new BNG strategy for the N2 Gateway Project. This 
has effectively meant that the budget for the N2 Gateway was incorrect from 
the very beginning. The background and reasons for this will now be 
explained. 
The housing subsidy system was installed in 1994, with the introduction of the 
Housing White Paper, within the RDP framework 102. There was considerable 
criticism of the manner in which South Africa came up with its subsidy policy 
100 Baker, K. 2006. Interview Material. Interview conducted at Thubelisha Homes Cape Town 
Office 16 October 200616:30 - 19:00. 
101 Oscroft, Peter (Peter.Oscroft@capetown.gov.za) 2006. Masters Thesis. [Personal email, 
31 October] to Paul Blake (blkpau002@mail.uct.ac.za). 
102 Department of Housing, 1994. White Paper- A New Housing Policy and Strategy for 











at the time. According to some critics, South Africa took very little advice from 
the World Bank and overseas experiences, and this they believe led to a great 
deal of problems 103. This said, however, the subsidy system proved to have 
been a fairly effective tool in housing delivery even though some problems 
have occurred. 
The crux of the subsidy system is that it involves a once-off grant of money 
from the government to enable a person to purchase a house or flat. A person 
does not receive this money in cash but the government pays this money to 
whoever is building the house. The amount of money a person will be granted 
depends on their household income. It works on a sliding scale so that the 
less you earn, the more your housing grant will be and visa versa 104. At the 
present moment someone in the lowest earning bracket (earning between RO 
and R1500) will receive a subsidy of R36 528. This figure, however, is 
insufficient according to housing officials at Thubelisha Homes (the project 
management company responsible for the N2 Gateway), and they thus have 
put forward a proposal for a new housing subsidy quantum. It proposes that 
someone earning between RO and R1500 should receive R40 618.00. 105 This 
is the exact cost of a 30m 2 house (both for the serviced stand and the 
construction). 
103 Gilbert, A. 2001. 'Scan Globally; Reinvent Locally': Reflecting on the Origins of South 
Africa's Capital Housing Subsidy Policy. In Urban Studies, Vol. 39, No. 10. Carfax Publishing, 
pp.1911-1933. 
104 Government Housing Subsidy. 2006. [Department of Housing, Western Cape - pamphlet]. 












This new subsidy system from Thubelisha is a good strategy if the aim is just 
to build 30m2 houses. This, however, is not the aim of the new BNG strategy, 
although as we will later learn the government has seemingly returned to its 
RDP roots 106. 
The existing housing subsidy system does not comply with the new BNG 
strategy. The existing subsidy policy is based on building houses, which are 
around 30m2 in size. The BNG strategy aims to build houses that are bigger 
than these, around 40m2 in size. The BNG house is a better quality house 
compared to the RDP house 107. Each unit is 40m2 in size and will contain 2 
bedrooms, a lounge, kitchen with steel sink and a bathroom. It is obviously 
more expensive to build a BNG house compared to a RDP house but this was 
not taken into account when the N2 Gateway promises were made to the 
people. In Thubelisha's Business Plan it states that 
.. .it has been recognized that the existing subsidy values are inadequate 
for the BNG strategy, and a review of the policy is underway108. 
According to Thubelisha's estimates, the cost of a 40m2 BNG house is R77 
574.00. This is made up of the cost of a serviced site (R22 608) and the 
amount needed for the raw materials and actual building of the house (R54 
966). This is already clearly in excess of the existing subsidy grant of R36 
106 Snyman, J. 2006. Interview with Jac Snyman (architect of Joe Siovo Phase 1). [November 
14]. 
107 New Homes, 2006. National Home Builders Registration Council. Cape Town, Mafube 
Publishing. pp. 16-19. 
108 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 











528. The R77 574 needed to build a BNG house does not include the BNG 
infrastructure (community facilities etc), which on its own amounts to roughly 
R64 000 per unit. This therefore means that the housing subsidy does not 
cover the cost of a new BNG house 109. The breakdown of these figures is 
given in the tables below. 
Table 7: Breakdown of Costs for N2 Gateway BNG House110 
Cost in 
Components Rands 
BNG House 54966 
Serviced Stand 22608 
BNG Infrastructure (social facilities, schools etc) 64000 
At present, further funding and grants have been made available to boost the 
existing subsidy amount. These involve the SCCCA Grant, the Geo Tech 
109 Baker, K. 2006. Interview Material. Interview conducted at Thubelisha Homes Cape Town 
Office 16 October 2006 16:30 - 19:00. 
110 Interview Material. Interview conducted at Thubelisha Homes Cape Town Office 16 
October 2006 16:30 - 19:00 & Data from N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 











Variance, DME funding and MIG/EFF funding (definitions of abbreviations 
given on the following page). This extra funding has made a difference but 
there still not enough money to allow the existing subsidy system to comply 
with the new BNG strategy. 





(Southern Cape Coastal Condensation Area - extra money 
set aside to plaster and waterproof houses in Southern 
Cape) 
Geo Tech Variance 
(15% of subsidy - paid in the Cape because of extra 
variables in weather) 
DME and MIG/EFF Funding 
(Department of Mineral and Energy responsible for 
electrification and Municipal Infrastructure Grant to pay for 




bulk components) 6752 












The funding of the BNG strategy therefore does not comply with the existing 
housing subsidy system, as the BNG subsidy formula is different to current 
housing subsidy formulas. According to the latest available N2 Gateway 
Business Plan 112, it is planned that BNG houses will be the primary typology 
to be used in the N2 Gateway initiative. The government needs to step in and 
amend the subsidy system if people are going to be able to afford a new BNG 
home. 
At present the subsidy predicament leaves only two options: either fewer 
houses will be built or more funding is needed. For the N2 Gateway Project to 
succeed, in the terms of the politicians who are pushing the initiative, the 
government or the private sector needs to step in and come up with the 
money to fill this massive financial gap of nearly R90 000 per BNG unit. 
According to Thubelisha Homes, the solution lies with policy change and they 
want the government to step in and make policy changes in order to make up 
for the drastic difference in funding 113. 
3.2.2 Funding Shortfall 
The magnitude of the N2 Gateway Project has meant that all three spheres of 
government are involved in the financing of the initiative. Due to its pilot 
nature, a huge amount of flexibility, with regards to budgets and existing 
housing programs has been demanded in an attempt to ensure housing 
delivery. The primary funders of the project are the National Department of 
112 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 
submitted by Thubelisha Homes, pp. 1-56. 











Housing (NOaH), the Provincial Department of Local Government and 
Housing and the City of Cape Town. Other major funders include the National 
Department of Mineral and Energy and the Provincial Departments of 
Education 114. 
This funding strategy has not met the needs of the project. Not enough money 
was set aside for the N2 Gateway to deliver on its 'promises' due to a miss-
alignment of budgetary instruments 115. Government funding is evaluated on a 
cyclical basis, making the large demand for money by the N2 Gateway project 
problematic. The existing housing budgets and allocation processes were not 
able to release enough funds to meet all the N2 requirements at the time116 . 
Kevan Baker suggests that it was clear that the initiative was actually 'cash 
strapped from the stare117 . 
One of the primary problems of the financing of the project was the overall 
budgeting of the initiative. Initially it was documented that around R1.8 billion 
was needed for the project118 . At present, Thubelisha Homes has reviewed 
114 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 
submitted by Thubelisha Homes, pp. 1-56. 
115 Oscroft, Peter (Peter.Oscroft@capetown.gov.za) 2006. N2 Gateway Project - Masters 
Thesis. [Personal email.50ctober]toPauIBlake(blkpau002@mail.uct.ac.za). 
116 Oscroft, Peter (Peter.Oscroft@capetown.gov.za) 2006. N2 Gateway Project - Masters 
Thesis. [Personal email.50ctober]toPauIBlake(blkpau002@mail.uct.ac.za). 
117 Baker, K. 2007. Interview Material. [Interview conducted on 8 May at the Wimpy in 
Somerset West]. 
118 Baker, K. 2006. Interview Material. Interview conducted at Thubelisha Homes Cape Town 











this and estimate that R3.418 billion will be needed for the project119. The 
reason for this radical difference in funding is due to the incorrect 
implementation of the new BNG strategy (largely related to the subsidy issues 
mentioned earlier). 
The City of Cape Town, through the project management of Cyberia, was the 
initial implementing agent of the N2 Gateway. The City obtains its funding for 
housing projects from the Province, which in turn obtains the funding from the 
National Government. The City of Cape Town in 2004, was annually allocated 
the equivalent of approximately 8000 housing subsidies 120. 
The N2 Gateway project intended to provide 22 000 units by 30 June 2005. 
This effectively meant that the City of Cape Town needed around five times 
the amount of money they usually received for housing. This money was 
'promised' by the National Department. Due to these promises that were 
made, the City of Cape Town went ahead with the consortiums on the 
assumption that the additional funding would be realized, but it never was 121. 
In an attempt to raise funds, the City tried to raise a loan of around R1.5 -
R1.8 billion. The city, however, did not have the authority to raise this loan. 
This effectively meant that the N2 Gateway was 'cash strapped,122. 
119 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 
submitted by Thubelisha Homes, pp. 1-56. 
120 Ross, N. 2006. Interview Material. Interview conducted at his City of Cape Town Office in 
Constantia. June 23. 
121 Oscroft, Peter (Peter.Oscroft@capetown.gov.za) 2006. Masters Thesis. [Personal email, 
31 October] to Paul Blake (blkpau002@mail.uct.ac.za). 
122 Baker, K. 2006. Interview Material. Interview conducted at Thubelisha Homes Cape Town 











The Cape Argus reported on 28 November 2005 that, Richard Dyantyi, the 
Local Government and Housing MEC, 'denied reports that the project was 
facing cash flow problems,123. Dyantyi and Nomaindia Mfeketo made it 
abundantly clear to the public that the rumours of financial problems were 
unfounded and that the N2 Gateway development was on track. In hindsight, 
this statement is hard to believe as by July 2006, only 705 units had been 
built, a far cry from the 22 000 units that were promised. This once again links 
back to the grand promises that were made to the public, which were then 
subsequently broken. Bridge funding will be sought to fund aspects of the 
project until grant funding is available from the government124. 
The Bulk and Link Infrastructure provision for the N2 Gateway is a clear 
example of misalignment of budget instruments that have been discussed in 
this paper. Municipal Infrastructure Grants (MIG) and External Financing 
Funds (EFF) were identified as the funding sources for the Bulk and Link 
Infrastructure. According to the latest figures, R126 million is the total cost 
estimate for the Bulk and Link Infrastructure for the Gateway development. 
The MIG and EFF funding can, however, only supply R84 million, which thus 
creates a shortfall of R42 million 125. 
123 Essop, P. 2005. Dyantyi denies cash woe for N2 Gateway. In Cape Argus, November 28. 
124 Ross, N. 2006. Interview Material. Interview conducted at his City of Cape Town Office in 
Constantia. June 23. 
125 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 











Table 9: Bulk and Link Infrastructure Expenditure 126 
Transportation, Water and Total project Standard MIG and 
Sanitation link services cost estimate EFF grant SHORTFALL 
within projects (R MILL) allowance (R MILL) (R MILL) 
Joe Siovo R 16 R 11 R4 
Delft 7-9 R 24 R 14 R 11 
Delft Symphony R 31 R 23 R8 
Boys Town R4 R4 
New Rest R1 R 1 
Sub-total R77 R53 R24 
Blue Downs 1892 R 10 R7 R4 
Wingfield R 39 R 25 R 14 
The reason for the R42 million shortfall is due to the fact that the standard 
grant allowances are not in tune with the new BNG standards. This situation is 
virtually identical to the subsidy problem and it shows a clear lack of planning 
on behalf of those responsible for the N2 Gateway project. Promises were 
made to the public but once again the research behind these promises was 
incorrect. 
126 Data from N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended 











3.2.3 Transitional Relocation Areas 
Transitional Relocation Areas are settlements made up of temporary houses 
that are used to house people on a temporary basis. People are moved here 
while infrastructure is built on the land that they were previously living on 127. 
3550 Transitional Relocation Areas are required for the N2 Gateway. The 
TRA requirement is relatively high due to the fast-track nature of the 
development. 
The City of Cape Town was initially responsible for this 'emergency housing' 
service. It was, however, discovered that the City did not have the resources 
or the budget to provide this service and relied on consortia to provide the 
TRA's at additional costs. The maintenance of the TRA's was also not 
accounted for in the initial Gateway budget. According to Thubelisha, the cost 
to maintain a TRA is estimated at around R100 per month. The cost therefore 
to maintain all the TRA's (other than normal municipal services that are 
provided for by the city) in one year is estimated at around R4.26 million 128. 
127 Ndenze, B. 2006. Delft 'dumping ground of the unwanted'. In Cape Times, October 18. 
128 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 











Illustration 3: Aerial photograph of a TRA Settlement in Delft ' :I'; 
Illustration 4: Delft TRA Units·" 
-
The original Business Plan for the N2 Gateway included the costs for the 
establishment of the TRA's, but did not take into account the expense incurred 
In order to remove such structures. The TRAs, once used have to be 
' 0;; N2 Gateway Project _ Overview 2005 Produced by T,ubelisha Homes. [PcwerPoint 
Prese~talloo1 












removed and often the land that they were built on, needs to be rehabilitated 
at a cost. It is estimated that this will cost around R3000 for each TRA Th is 
increased the N2 Gateway budget by R10,65 million, 
Table 10: Transitional Relocation Areas '" 
Expenses Number of Units lca"{loiiO,id,;)T 
Establishment 3550 R 23 ODO R 81,650,000 00 
Removal 3550 R 3,00D R 10,650,000.00 
Ma,ntenance R 19.700,000,00 
The initial budget for the N2 Gateway did not include the TRA removal and 
maintenance expenses (highlighted in the table above) , These expenses 
amount to R30 35 mil lion and have been included ',n the latest Business Plan 
(September 2006)_ The initial budget for the TRAs was therefore way below 
what was actual ly needed and this has led to problems and time delays_ 
. ,. 
, Data from N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006 Draft 6, 2000, Updated, alne,yjed 











3.3 Time Delays 
The time delays of the N2 Gateway project have occurred for numerous 
reasons In essence, however, one common thread runs throughout the entire 
process Politicians wanted to achieve goals, which were grand in nature. This 
desire, however. caused officials to become more conservative with regards 
to the decisions that they have to make. Politicians pushed for fast tracked 
delivery and urgent t ime frames, but this urgency ultimately had a negative 
effect 011 the proJect1J:! The reasons for this will now be explained 
3.3.1 PFMA and MFMA problems 
The Procurement Finance Management Act (PFMA) and Municipal Finance 
Management Act (MFMA) are Acts that have been enforced by the 
government to prevent corruption and fraud within the public sector. These 
Acts are extremely useful and are desperately needed . The concept behind 
the Acts is that a person signing any document rela\lng to a government 
project is held personally responsible for the consequences of that document 
This therefore prevents people from laundering money as they are held 
personally accountable . This is incredibly important as it is a direct means of 
curtailing corruption The Acts have , however, caused problems, which have 
resulted in time delays for the Gateway development133 
." Winfield, M 2006 A Livlt)g Space lor All The Political VlSbn. Del very Mechanislrs and 
Social Needs infbmcing the N2 Gateway Project, pp. 1-8 











PFMA artd MFMA regulatlorts cause a persort to take personal responsibility 
for the consequences of signing off a document. Those signing the documellt 
will ensure that they have checked all legal parameters prior to signing the 
document. In order for a person to do this a number of processes have to be 
adhered to alld this is a lengthy process from a practical point of view and 
every individual that has to sign will ensure that he or she has checked all 
possible variab les before signing 
The PFMA and the MFMA do not cause time delays but the problem lieS with 
the illterpretation of these acts, accord illg to Baker The different variables 
involved and varying interpretations of the acts cause a great deal of 
cortfusion artd ultimately lead to t ime delays, In the case of the N2 Gateway 
the laws and acts goveming the cOllduits for funding are not properly 
understood by all those involved in the fundirtg process. which therefore 
resulted in seriOUS time delays Th iS has effectively meant that the time 
frames set by the politicians cou ld not be adhered tol14, 
Kevan Baker stated that. 
not even the politicians understand what the effect of a public 
statement Ilas on tile programme "nd "Iso the leg"lities surrounding the 
plDcess necessary to implement the promise or promises m"de by tiJese 
statements with regard to the time frames'1'} 
," Ba<er. K. 2006. Interview Material. In terv;aw comiucteli at Thubeiisha Homes Cape Town 
OffK':e 15 October 20061530 - 19.00 











Politicians placed immense pressure on housing officials to deliver. They did 
this by making grand delivery promises to the public without having adequate 
k.nowledge of the processes involved . Ironically, this pressure actually delayed 
the delivery of the N2 Gateway project 
3.4 N2 Gateway and Consortiums 
3.4.1 Bids 
The bidding process during the N2 Gateway project was fraught with 
problems. Bids were reportedly ret racted and fe-advertised, which according 
to those in the construction industry. constituted unprofessional practices136 
Bids were a lso advertised during the Christmas/New Year Break. (2004), when 
consortiums tradit ionally do not conduct business This created much 
contusion amongst the consortlums':) t 
When bids were accepted it was apparent that the 'City officials and their 
advisors had had little or no experience of turnkey contracts·n8 Turnkey 
contracts' place a great amount of responSibility on consortiums as these 
companies are responsible for the development from the planning to the 
delivery phase. In the case of the N2 Gateway, however, the consortiums 
co, Winf.,ld, M. 2~C>6 inteNlew Material [lnte.'Vlew cot"l{lucted at Mur .. ay & East on 25 
September 20C>6[ 
. " , Baker, K. 2006. Inte·view Materia l Inter.llew GonduGted at Thubel isM Homes Cape Town 
Office 16 OGtober 20C>6 163~- 1900 
" Winfield. M 2006. A Li~iflg Space for AI!. The Political VisOn. Delivery Mechanisms ~nd 
Social Needs inlluenang the N2 Gateway P"Oject, p~. 5 
• A contract lor a pfOjeGt in which the developer lakes on a wide scope of responSibility to 












were not allowed to exercise this 'authority' as the housing bodies were too 
involved in the process and wouldn 't allow the consortiums to 'honour' the 
'turnkey concept'. An example of this was the fact that the City had organized 
their own staff to plan and design some developments, when this was actually 
the consortiums responsibility in terms of a turnkey contract This caused 
much tension and misunderstanding on behalf of the consortiums The 
Turnkey Contractors requested contract documents to protect the interests of 
the Client and Turnkey Contractor alike, Due to the financial issues mentioned 
before, no contracts were signed and only Letters of Appointment existed (this 
will be discussed in Chapter 542) ThiS created much confusion and led to 
much abortive work- 3 ' , 
3.4.2 Awarding of Tenders and Contracts 
Numerous problems have surrounded the contractual arrangements with the 
consortiums responsible for delivering the N2 Gateway project. The following 
development consortiums were 'employed' to deliver the infrastructure for the 
N2 Gateway' Sobamb isana Vula Joint Venture, Bahlodi/Maluleke/Luthuli 
Consortium and Ibuyile Deveiopment l4C 
Advisor to the Minister of Housing Mr Saths Moodley. made it abundantly 
clear at a briefing meeting on 10 January 2005 that 'sufficient funding was 
' " Winfield, M 2005 A Living Space fiX All. The Pc>itkoal Vision, Delivery Mecl1~n l 5ms and 
Soc",1 Needs influencing the N2 Gatew~y Prcject , pp, 1·8 










available and that no bridging finance would be reqwred from the Tumkey 
Contractors'1' ' 
The consortiums responsible for the N2 Gateway cOllstruction accepted their 
appointment with the understanding that funds were both approved and had 
been released This, however; was not correct despite Mr Moodley's 
statemerlt Keith SIPOYO, spokesman for Ibuyile consortium . records his 
attendance at a meeting with City offjcials after the GOllsortium had been 
appointed 'Three GOllsortiums (involved in the N2 Gateway) were called to 
the 2200 floor of th e civic centre where they were told by officials that Drily 
R300m was available for all three consortiums·1<2 This figure of R300m was 
considerably short of the Rl.2 billion that was originally budgeted for the N2 
Gateway project at the time, 
This shortf;:!11 in funding effectively meant that contracts could not be 
concluded as the city could not sign off on contracts for which they did not 
have the money'43, City regulations hold Cape Town City officials personally 
accountable for the contracts they sign (refer to Chapter 5.3 for explanation) 
Understandably City officials were unwilling to sign contracts ThiS contractual 
issue was incredibly problematic as projects had to be re-priolltized based on 
the funding that was available, 
". Wlnfiel", M 2C()3. A LIVing Space for All The PolltKOa Vision, Del iver/ Mec~an lsms an" 
SOCial Needs influencing t~e N2 Gateway Project , pp, 1-8 
", Powell. A, 2C()3, Problems dog Gateway, but officials say project.s 'on tra~k' In Cape 
Trues, Januacy 26 
. ., 
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The City advised that as a result of cashflO\v problems wllich existed, 
relating to tile funding of the N2 Gate\vay Projects, it was necess8lY to 
review tile projects tllat \vere currently in progress 144 , 
The lack of funding was not the only issue that led to contracts not being 
signed Some contractors and the City could not come to agreement on 
pricing Issues , The City wanted consortiums to lower their prices in 
accordance with the available housing subsidy regime (as discussed In 
Chapter 5 2 1), Ibuyile was the only consortium to agree to the requested cost 
changes"~ The other consortiums said they were unable to reduce their 
prices to bring them within the housing subsidy regime This caused further 
problems and delays 
The delays in releasing money to the consortiums for work completed caused 
much dissatisfaction on behalf of the construction companies involved with the 
project. Minutes entitled 'N2 Gateway-Symphony Way community', record that 
the bui lding contractors worked al risk' for six weeks and a consortium 
'experienced a delay in tenns of {payment of] its claims to council for work 
Two further examples illustrate the extent of the consequences of the funding 
problems incurred in the Gateway initiative, Firstly , Vula Joint Venture noted 
that since its receipt of its Leiter of Appointment from the city for the Boys 
W KIPPS, S. 2C05. N2 Gateway PrOject- Record of Meeting hel~ between t~e City, PMU and 
Vllla Joint Ije.lture on 14 Novem c.er 2005. [Document wri~e,o by Vula Jo nt Ventu re I 
'" Memorandllm. 2000. The potential liability of tre City of Cape Town: N2 Gateway Project: 
March 2CC6. C~eadle Thompso.l & Hay50m Inc. Attor,1eys, 
'" Powell, A 2006 ProblOO1s dog Gateway, but offKoia·S say project is 'on track' 1.0 Cape 










Town project seven months previously, not one payment had been made to 
them "P Secondly, Sobambisana consortium reported that they experienced 
problems in respect of paying the subcontractors employed by them, Workers 
working for the subcontractors were being underpaid as the city did not have 
enough money to pay the consortiums. 
Workers are being underpaid every fortnight, For example some 
workers are meant 10 gel paid about R1800 every fOltnigilt, but 
tlley only get R700. In otller cases. sub-contractors only receive 
R4 000 when they have to pay wages in excess of R18 000'4a 
Contractors were given their mandates once Letters of Appointment were 
signed, and were given permission to start construction. The drafting of these 
documents was, however, done in a rushed manner to meet an unrealistic 
deadline and was therefore sub-standard The scope of the work was thus not 
clearly defined and the technical content of the documents was insufficient'49 
The plans for the N2 Gateway changed a number of t imes after the 
appointment of the panel of Turnkey Contractors causing delays and abortive 
costs The total fo r all the abort ive work, loss of profit and overhead costs for 
the contractors amounted to R56 million (this amount could have been used to 
construct around 720 BNG houses). The City had only paid R6,5 million , for 
'<7 Kipps S,2005 N2 Gateway Project- Record of Meeting "eld between the City, PMU and 
Vula Joint Venture on ~' 4 November 20D5, [Documen t written by Vula Jo,nt Venture] 
" Bulelani, p, 2005, Gateway allocation row drags on, In Entoe? August 4 
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abortive work, to the consortiums by 26 June 2006 ':.0, (no further information 
on th'rs issue was available when the dissertation was submitted) 
3.5 Political Issues 
The N2 Gateway Project has been and is marked by polit'lcal and power 
struggles amongst those responsible for delivering the project The 
relationship between the three tiers of government has caused severe 
problems for the Gateway initiat'lve 
The City of Cape Town was accused of using the N2 Gateway as a 'political 
football' and was eventually stripped of its respons ibil ities' by the national 
government in 2006. Interestingly , this was done on the day before the local 
elections, when an agreement was signed with Thubelisha Homes, This 
effectively placed the next phase of the project in the hands of the provincial 
and national govemment This meant that when the DA came to power in 
March 2006, the project had 'already' been taken out of their hands Helen 
Zille made this clear. by saying that although they were now officially taken off 
the project, this process had already taken place prior to the elections 15' 
All the indications are that the ANC led local government, prior to DA coming 
into office, was not manag'lng the N2 Gateway correctly. It could be argued 
'" N2 Ga~eway, 2005, Housing Strategy Committee June 26 
• The City IS s:,11 responSible lor delivering bas e services and IS tI1us not to~ally remo,ed rrom 
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that the defeat of the ANC and the length of time in which it took to the DA to 
secure a coalition government obscured this incapacity of the previous ANC 
city council Th is could have led to the interpretation both by commentators 
and party affi liates that the removat of the City of Cape Town off the project 
was directly related to the ANC 'losing' the City 
It is clear from the above information that trying to get the three levels of 
govemment to work together was problematic from the start due to the 
'political opportunism' that was involved 152 Some have even gone as far, like 
DA leader, Kent Morkel, to suggest that 'the N2 Gateway project must be the 
biggest political blunder that has happened in this city so farm. 
Mike Winfield , from the Martin & East consortium. argues from a micro level 
and suggests that the pol iticians can be blamed for many of the problems 
relating to the N2 Gateway initiative. He argues that the politicians took over 
the tradit ional roles of the technical officials, a role which they do not normally 
have the qualifications to fu lfi ll. Examples of this were firstly, that pol iticians 
effectively 'programmed' the project by settil1g deadlines, An illustration of th is 
was the way in wh ich Nomaindia Mfeketo made delivery promises to the 
people154 , Secondly, politicians made decisions on the subsidy processes, 
\Nhich were not theirs to make. Thirdly. the politicians introduced a fast-
" Marrs, D. 2005. QU>ck Fixes IOiIi not ease Cape's Housing CrISis. In Business D8y. March 
" 
" Scott. J 2DC5. A day when Mayor Mfeketo was calted to order from the gallery In Entoe? 
June 1 
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trackirlg approval process without properly understanding the eXisting housing 
regulations, governing the housing delivery process Finalry- , the politicians 
made public announcements and decisions on funding sources, which were 
not theirs to make 
Winfield suggests that the political visiorl of the pollticiarls set 'unrealistic 
deadlines/targets that the d€livery mechanism could not meet' , The idea and 
the concept to deliver houses on a fast track basis was somethlllg that was 
sorely needed but Winfield suggests that the mallner ill which the process 
was put into practice was incorrecf 55, 
Nick Graham's work Or! informal setllemellt upgradillg ill Cape Towll agrees 
with W'lnfield's assessment and makes all importallt point with regards to the 
political issues that are present well dealing with currerlt housillg projects. 
He argues that under apartheid a great deal of power wasillvested ill built 
environment professionals (p lanners, architects and engilleersj who would 
plan arid shape cities in a techllocratic malliler. Over time. however. this 
power has shifted dramatically into the polit ical sphere This is h'lghlighted in a 
quote from an unnamed city official. commentirlg 011 the state of Cape Town's 
irlformal settlemerltsl ~i) 
,,~, WinfiekJ, M 2000 A L:ving Space lor All The Po lltk:ill ViSion, Del,verf Mechanisms and 
Social Ne"ds inflll"ncing the N2 Gateway Project , pp, 1-8 
" . Gra~am, N 2DC4, Informal SeWement Upgradi'19 in Cape Town, Ch;J'lenges, constraints 
and contrad don within loca', gOyernment. University of Oxford , Sc~ool of Geograp~y and the 











All this mess is because of high-handed decision making 
Fifteen years ago if vIas the officials who were higIJ-IJanded and 
got taken to task about it, No\'/ the politicians are doing It 107 
The struggle for power betv"een officials and politicians has clearly had a 
negative influence on the Gateway project 
The politics with'ln informal settlements has also caused major problems for 
the N2 Gateway. Due to bad policing. unemployment and crime. individuals 
known as shacklords ('traditional gatekeepers'). have been able to assume 
positions of power within irlformal settlements and have a major influence on 
commurlity lifelM 
In informal settlements where shacklords are preserlt, it is common for them 
to be responsible for service delivery due to their power and control over the 
community. Shack lords 'exploit grievances and tensions vlifhin the community 
to undermine tllei,. authority [of newly elected leaders and housing institutions] 
and sabotage public development projects'· ~; These power struggles 
be\1Neen shacklords. their communities, police and local government officials 
has hampered development init iatives, In the case of the N2 Gateway this has 
had a negative effect as city officials have strugg led to command a strong 
. ,-
, Graham, N 2004 Infcrmal Seltlement Upgrading in Ca~e Town. Cra enges, constraints 
and conl!<.;J >ellon wi:hin IDCa, gcvernment. University of Oxfcrd, School of Geography and Ire 
Environment. rttp:/bINIW, ',";ts.aC,Zailnfcrmals.ettlements/Nlck%20Graham. pdf 
" Cross, C, 2Co·J5, HSRC Review The Battle for Crossrca-;Js: The return of the shacklcrds. 
http:.'i,,""'whsrcac.za!inde. 
"' ~ Tvok, ; & Watscn, V 2001 Divergent Dev!!l0'men: in Soutr Alr",an Cities: St-ategic 










influence and presence in the communities, thus hindering housing research 
and its delivery. 
3.6 Communication 
The N2 Gateway project. being a pilot initiative comprises a number of new 
concepts and strategies One of the most significant of these IS the idea of 
involving all three spheres of government in the project. The successful 
implementation of the N2 Gateway project depends on the close cooperation 
and clear communication between the three tiers of government '5oJ . This 
project would test and assess the capacity of the spheres of government to 
work both 'vertically' and 'horizontal~'. The media's assessment of this 
capacity is clearly very negative. One only needs to read a headline of the 
Cape Times on 13 June 2006 - 'City kicked off Gateway plDject"61, a clear 
sign that the three tiers could not work together The primary cause of this 
problem was the politics (mentioned in Chapter 5.5) and lack of proper 
communication between the different parties involved'52, 
Transparent communication between the three tiers of government and the 
public was a crucial in order for the N2 Gateway project to run smoothly, 
Councilor Ross from the Democratic Alliance has. however. argued that 
throughout the early stages of the N2 Gateway there was a lack of 
' '''' Bnefing document for the N2 Gateway P,oject. 2CC6 [Par: of media pack handed cul at 
the olliei'll launch or Phase 2 01 the N2 Gateway P,ojectj 
''I Powell. A. 2006. City kicked 011 Gateway project. Cape T mes. June 13 











transparency, with regards to the decision-making and communicating 
processes 163, Decisions were taken without much consultation, as the 
government wanted to fast track the housing process, Many decisions were 
reportedly made via private cell phone calls and emails164, The 'fast track' 
approach was taken, so tha t the government could be seen to be delivering 
houses to the people, This, however, resulted in a 'very top-down' approach, 
with decisions being made by a select few, resultlllg in much unhappiness 
from the people on the ground'G, 
It could be argued that one of the key factors causing the communication 
problems is directly related to the tight time frames placed on the N2 Gateway 
project It not only 'imposed' practices of cell phone communication rather 
than paper communication but it also affected communication between the 
public and the government and amongst the three tiers of government that 
were meant to be working together, Decisions were forced to be made quickly 
and therefore a partic ipatory approach was not adopted, Evidence of this was 
seen during the planning phase when it was thought that more people could 
afford to rent units, when this was clearly not the case (Chapter 5.8), 
The lack of communication upset many communities Parties 'Involved in the 
decision-making processes, did not make infDrmation readily available to the 
'" RC55 N, 2004i2005r2000, N2 Gateway Nct~s. [Unpub li shed perso~al documents[ . 
,. 
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'" Sm;\, Warren (Warrens@dagorgziI)2006, Masters Tne.i. - N2 Gateway [Personal 










public resultir'lg in the perpetuation of escalatlr'lg expectations and the 
breakir'lg of promises 115". 
3.7 Allocation Process 
The demand for housing has beer'l and is a majOr polrtical issue in South 
Africa. This is directly related to the significant perhaps best termed 
overwhelmir'lg housir'lg backlog , the current rate of urbanization: the absence 
or low income of those seeking shelter and the inability of local authorities to 
deliver houses either of quality ar'ld/or in quar'lt ity157. 
The scale of the soc'lal housing need that the South Africar'l government must 
address is greater than that faced by any western governillent. The 
governmer'lt has beer'l able to deliver 1.7 million houses sir'lce 1994, which is 
ar'l achievement ('unparalleled internatkma l ly'16~). but the demand for houses 
still outweighs the supply The waitir'lg list for housir'lg in South Africa has 
grown expor'ler'ltiallyjG~. 
" Bregmac, M. & Snyman J.2007 Interview Material. Interview conducted On May 4 
'" Simons, M. 2007. interview Materia!. Interview cocducted on 10 May 
" ~ Rust, K 2003. AnalysIs 01 South AlrK:a's Housing Sector Performance - FinMark Trust 
http.i"""""'''.linm arktrust. org.z".ldocumentst2007.1MarchiHsectoranalysis. pdf Website accessed 
on 14 May 2007 pp. 7 
." Rust. K. 2005. T~ Waiting Game: in the queue lor t>ou,ong subs.:fles [OnWne[. Available 










The shortfall of housing in the Western Cape was 162371 houses in 1994170 , 
By 2005, the government had bU ilt 210118 houses in the Western Cape'71, 
This delivery should have negated the backlog figures of 1994 but at present 
the Western Cape stil l has a backlog of 320 000 Th is backlog can be partially 
attributed to the 48 000 peop le who arrive in the province on an annual basis 
in search of worfc access to education and access to health care. The 
Western Cape's budget only allows the province to build 18000 houses per 
year172 If the restriction on building more units is retained and this trend 
continues, the hous ing backlog wi ll be over 600 000 by 20 16* These figures 
do not take into account the fact that housing quality has also deteriorated 
over time and that even more houses will be needed to rep lace those, which 
have collapsed , The issue of who is first in line to receive a govemment 
subsidized home 'IS thus of major importance to many South Africans 
The history of South Africa has caused the creation of a housing waiting list to 
become complicated and highly politicized. Coklured people were given 
preferential treatment ',n the Western Cape, which resulted in the fact that no 
complete black housing lists exist and therefore it is difficult for the 
government to determ ine whose hous ing needs should be addressed firs!. 
L" Khan, F & Thring, P 2003. Housing P:;><oy and Practice in Post-Apartooid South Alrica 
Sandown, Heinemann Publlsoors (Pty) Ltd , p» . 1-132 
F1 , South Alnca Survey 2oo4/20D5, Johanneswrg, South Alncal1 Inst itute 01 Race Relations , 
pp. 383-457 
'" BUSiness Day 2006 BBC in p;ctures leaving Cape Town Shacks June 28, 2000 











The fact that there are also numerous housing waiting lists has also added to 
this problem l 73 
All housing information !leaded to be combined into one list in order to be fair 
to all possible berleficiaries The problem caused by pool1l19 data and creating 
one list is that how do officials decide what order people will be placed on this 
list. An example of this is seen in Cynthia Nosipho Bokwe's story. Cynthia arld 
her four children have spent 31 years in a one·bed roomed hostel In 1981 
she applied for a government subsidized house but as of yet nothing has 
changed for her_ How does someone decide whether Cynthia's claim should 
be answered before someone else's , as there are thousands of people with 
similar stories to Cynthia 174 Thubelisha, have seemingly come up with a 
solution to this problem and it is discussed in Chapter 5,7,1 and Chapter 6170 , 
3.7.1 The Beneficiaries 
The N2 Gateway will benefit around 100 000 people1TO The database list for 
the rec ipiellts was sourced from three locations. Firstly, the housing waiting 
lists from areas surround ing the N2 Gateway, Secondly, a database put 
together from a survey of the targeted informal settlements for the N2 
'." Baker, K. 2c:<J7 In:er,lIew Material [Inter,iew conduced on 8 May at the \,Vimpy in 
Somerset West] 
II. Essop, P 20C:<:}. After 3' years in r,:;.stel family overjoyed y" th new house' In Cape Argus 
July,9 
'.'> Baker K. 20C:<:}. In!~fviee/ Mal&li~J. Interview conducted at Thubelisr,a Homes Cape Town 
OffK:e 16 Octooa- 2c:<J6 1630 -1900 












Gateway. Thirdly, a list of people waiting for houses in Delft who could not be 
accommodated1 .'I, 
The allocation policy for the Gateway states that 70% of the units will be given 
to people living in shacks in the targeted settlements. while the other 30% will 
be given to backyard dwellers from the 10 areas surrounding these 
communities 17~, 
The N2 Gateway allocation strategy explained above has been fraught with 
criticism and controversy. The first problem was thai there was a multiplicity of 
waiting lists, Th is was extremely problematic as it created major confusion as 
to who was eligible for housing. These housing lists were thus consolidated 
into one waiting list and this was done by two independent companies, Price 
Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) and Nkonki'N The idea behind creating one 
single database. according to Kevan Baker, was that a 'filtration' system could 
be applied to the list so that it could filter people from those who needed a 
house the most, to those that needed a house the least'80. At present. this 
'filtration' concept has not yet been approved'81. 
'" Bulelar_i, p, 2005, Gateway mOve put off un~1 September. In Cape Argus Jeff ,2 
'" Mre;;eto. N. 2005. N2 Gateway Briefing Dcwmellt. [M inister of Housirg Briefing on 
Housirg Med ia Event1 February '4 
170 Briefir_g document for the N2 Gateway Project, 2006, :P3't of media pack handed out at 
tne officiallaoncil of Phase 2 of the N2 Gateway PrOject] 
"," Baker. K. 2006 Intery ew Materia l. Interview condlK:ted at Th ube isha HOf'les Cape Town 
Office 16 October 2006 16 30 - 1 9: 00 












The majority of stakeholders accepted the concept of merging al l past waiting 
lists into one single list but this was problematic due to the research methods 
that were used to compile it Added to the wait ing lists that already existed. a 
survey was conducted to determine the housing needs of the targeted 
informal settlements This survey was a 'census type" survey that gave 
household details such as income levels, number of dependants and 
employment statuses. This survey was, however, done during the December 
holidays, when the majority of the residents were In the Eastern Cape 1B 2, This 
was extremely prob lematic as this meant thai the data that was captured was 
insufficient and incomplete. When Peter Oscroft was questioned on this 
'error', he put the 'b lame' on the politicized natu re of the process' dO, Time 
frames had been installed by politicians and needed to be met. causing the 
sUflley to be conducted at the incorrect time 
Mike Winfield argues that the 'census problem' was a clear case of politicians 
taking oller the tradit ional roles of technical offic ials, which was commonly 
seen during the planning and early implementation phase of the N2 Gateway 
i nitiatille 1 84, 
'" Ross, N 2006. illteNIe',,, Materia!. Interv'ew conducted a~ his City of C~pe Tow~ OfficG in 
Cons[Jntia JJI"1e 23 
," Oscroft. Peter (peter.Oscrolt©Capetoll'n gov .a} 2006, N2 Ga[eway Project - Masters 
Thesis [Per~onal email. 5 October[ to Pau ' Blake (blkcall002@maiLJCL<lC,za) 
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At present Thubelisha Homes is responsible for the allocation process and 
according to their latest Business Plan that have put forward a strategy to 
combat the allocation problems experienced above (Chapter 6) 
3.8 The Joe Siovo Problem 
The first phase of the N2 Gateway project, which saw the erection of 705 
walk-up renta l units, was hallded over in June 2006. It was built on lalld 
previously mhabited by those living irl the Joe Siovo informal settlement. Due 
to a fire in the settlement. prior to any construction on N2 Gateway project, 
mallY of the reskiell!s losl their homes' 85 These peop le were relocated to 
temporary housing facilities (TRAs) in Delft arid were given the impression 
thai they could retum to the land they prevIOusly occupied once construction 
(of the rental units) had been completed. This did not turn out to be the case, 
as this paper has already discussed (Chapter 5.1) and the Joe Siovo 
settlemer1t became a site of great cOr1t roversy, 
The quality of the wa lkup un its delivered in the first phase of the Gateway 
Project has beer1 highly cOr1tentious issue, Since residents have moved in to 
'Phase l' of the Gateway project. the Rental Tribunal Office in Cape Town has 
been 'inundated with complaints' from residents Riedwaan Davids, the N2 
Gateway's project manager, who is employed by Thubellsha , has said that 
they have attended to about 1000 complaints (at least one per tenar1t) l~B, 
, 0> Ci ty ofCapB Town, 2005. Langa, Joo Siovo Fires _ HqJB for Fire Victims. [On;'lne[ 
http://wvrwcapetown.gov.za!pressiNewpress [Site OCCBSSBd on 22 May 2007[ 











Commenting on the construction quality of the units, an engineer, who wants 
to remain anonymous, said that the workmanship for the Joe Siovo settlement 
was 'shocking and substandartr 
Some walls are one brick-layer thick and if an adult funs into it, it 
could collapse Some of the building Walk done is simply done 
wrongly and cannot be fixed - it will have to be rebuilt I'm 
seeing cracks rhat one should only start seeing after Ihree or 
fOlif years. Comers were cut: rile builders were probably in a 
hurry and I'm guessing Ihere was very little supervision 
happening while lile bulldmg was in progress187 , 
In response to the complaints raised by residents Local Government and 
Housing MEC Richard Dyantyl, agreed that the some of the work done in 
Phase 1 of the N2 Gateway was sub-standard. He asked for patie nce from the 
residents so that the problems and structural defects could be sorted outns 
'" Joubert, P 2007 N2 Gateway. thil1gs fail apart Ir. Mail & Guardiar.. March. 24 











Illustralion 5: An example of the walkup units in Joe Slovo '"" 
-----------~--------. --
When the first phase of the N2 Gateway was handed over, a glamorous 
media event was held to celebrate the occasion For this event, the Minister of 
Housing, Lindiwe Sisulu, asked for the 'maintenance house' on the site to be 
converted into a creche for the handover ceremony (for aesthetiC purposes), 
rhis was duly done even though the cost was over Rl00 000 as children's 
play equipment, pictures and new flooring had to be set up This creche 
would however, never be used It was situated directly below large power 
cables, a health risk for the children that would use it and therefore it was 
never opened, No replacement creche has been set up"", Added to th is 
creche issue, very few community facilities have b€en set up In the 
,'" N2 Gateway Overview 2000. Proauced for National Department of Housing. [PowerPm,t 
Presenlatlon] 












settlement, showing once again how the BNG strategy has not been properly 
implemented. 
The construction plans for the Joe Siovo settlement were also problematic. 
According to Kevan Baker, there was a misunderstanding between the 
consortiums and the housing officials on the 'make-up' of some of the walkup 
units. Due to a typing error in the planning document, some units were built as 
three roomed flats instead of three bed-roomed units. This was problematic as 
tenants who had applied for three bed-roomed units would not have enough 
bedrooms for their families. This dilemma was solved through the construction 
of dry walls. This problem once again showed the challenging nature of the 
N2 Gateway Project191 . 
Another problematic issue relating to the Joe Siovo settlement involves the 
roofs of the settlement. Minister Sisulu ordered the roofs of the walkup units to 
be painted red as she had seen them painted red in the illustrated plans. The 
roofs, however, were purposefully not painted red as they were constructed 
out of a special material used to reflect heat, which would thus keep the units 
cool. The Minister, however, overruled this and many of the roofs were 
painted red, adding to the expense of the Joe Siovo settlement. 192 
191 Baker, K. 2007. Interview Material. [Interview conducted on 25 May at the Wimpy in 
Somerset West]. 













The N2 Gateway project management contract was awarded to 
Johannesburg-based Cyberia Technologies in 2004. This was a highly 
controversial appointment and many have argued that the appointment of 
Cyberia has led to many problems for the Gateway project193 . 
According to a July 2004 report to the city manager, it was recommended that 
the UAI Consortium, headed by Africon, be given the tender for the project 
management position. This would be at a tendered price of just over R3.5 
million. In December 2004, this line of thinking changed and Cyberia was 
granted the tender for the N2 Gateway for a total cost of R5 million 194. The 
reason for this change is still under investigation and no concrete answers 
have been found as to why Cyberia received the tender ahead of UAI 
Consortium. (The results from the forensic audit were still outstanding when 
the dissertation was submitted 195) 
Councilor Neil Ross, chairman of the housing portfolio committee, has publicly 
indicated that 'Cyberia did not comply with either the financial or technical 
criteria required to win a tende,,196. Another reporter commented that 'Cyberia 
was not the tender evaluator's choice and was originally the sixth-listed bidder 
193 Ross, N. 2007. Interview Material. Interview conducted at his City of Cape Town Office in 
Constantia. April 20. 
194 Powell, A. 2006. Legal opinion given to Sisulu questioned Gateway contract. In Cape 
Times, June 23. 
195 Powell, A. 2007. Forensic audit still outstanding after a year. In Cape Times, May 28. 











before being mysteriously bumped Up,197. Cyberia's experience was in 
Information Technology and had very little knowledge of public sector 
initiatives. According to Jac Snyman, they had 'never run a housing project 
before' .198 
Peter Oscroft, project co-ordinator of the city, informed the director of finance 
Ike Nxedlana in a confidential email that 
On the basis of Cyberia's submission... the adjudication 
committee did not consider Cyberia sufficiently experienced in 
the housing and infrastructure field to consider them beyond the 
first stage and therefore did not open their financial proposal199. 
Cyberia, however, received the tender through a 'closed tender process', the 
final decision being made to accept Cyberia by The Councils Goods Services 
& Properties Advisory Committee2oo. 
According to Ian Neilson, mayoral committee member for finance 
... there was an instruction somewhere along the line, we are not yet 
sure where, that tender evaluation reports should not include 
recommendations201 
197 Thamm, M. 2006. Hiccups in grand housing design. In Mail & Guardian. June, 30. 
198 Bregman, M. & Snyman, J. 2007. Interview Material. Interview conducted on May 4. 
199 Powell, A. 2006. Another city tender scandal. In Cape Times, April 12. 
200 Oscroft, Peter (Peter.Oscroft@capetown.gov.za) 2007. N2 Gateway Project - Masters 
Thesis. [Personal email.12April]toPauIBlake(blkpau002@mail.uct.ac.za). 
201 Cape Argus, 2006. Probe into mUlti-million rand city tender deals granted without council 
approval. [Online] http://www.12b.co.za/Construction_News/Article/Articie [Site accessed on 











This meant that without recommendations, the adjudication committee could 
ignore the findings made by the evaluation committee, who had 
recommended UAI Consortium. 
Handwritten comments on the document that accepted Cyberia as the Project 
Manager, interestingly show that Cyberia was chosen as it had a better price, 
it was a BEE company and it had previous public sector experience. It has 
also been alleged by project sources that the reason why Cyberia won the 
tender was due to its experience with multi-million rand projects. According to 
Ross, however, they shouldn't have secured the tender as it 'had little or no 
experience in the public sector. Its experience was in IT202 . 
Cyberia's tender price was R5 million but by November 2005, they had 
demanded a further R3 million over and above the R5 million it had already 
received. This money was granted to Cyberia without the issue being referred 
to the housing committee or council203 . 
In January 2006, Wallace Mgoqi, the city manager, terminated the contract of 
Cyberia Technologies. Before this was passed, however, Cyberia was granted 
an additional R4.6 million. Cyberia's contract had thus come to over R12 
million. Mgoqi, in terms of delegated powers, was allowed to push through 
tenders that were under R10 million, but anything over this amount should 
202 Ross, N. 2006. Interview Material. Interview conducted at his City of Cape Town Office in 
Constantia. June 23. 











have been put forward before the council. This was, however, not done, 
adding to the controversy surrounding the Project Management position204 . 
Kevan Baker has argued that the controversial reports surrounding Cyberia's 
involvement in the N2 Gateway have been rather misleading. Firstly, the 
reason Cyberia was given extra money was that the company needed to pay 
extra staff. According to Baker, Cyberia was seriously understaffed and they 
had to be given permission by the Minister of Housing to take on more staff. 
When this permission was granted, they required more money to pay their 
new employees, thus causing the company to demand more money. 
Secondly, the three spheres of government involved in the Gateway project 
had not done the planning for the Gateway project correctly and this led to 
many cost overruns that Cyberia was blamed for~w5. This said, however, it is 
still alarming that a company, who had never run a housing project before, 
was given the tender to run a multi-billion rand social housing project. 
In February 2006, two major changes took place with regards to the N2 
Gateway project. Firstly, the implementation responsibility was shifted from 
the City of Cape Town to the Provincial Government of the Western Cape. 
Secondly, Thubelisha Homes (a Section 21 Company with government 
support206) replaced Cyberia Technologies as the Implementing Agent and 
Project Manager for the Province with respect to the housing component. The 
204 Powell, A. 2006. N2 Gateway claims threaten housing project. In Cape Times, June 2. 
205 Baker, K. 2007. Interview Material. [Interview conducted on 8 May at the Wimpy in 
Somerset West]. 











City was now only responsible for the provision of specific infrastructure207, 
These changes were made in order to try put the project 'back on track' after a 
'plethora of severe problems were experienced during Cyberia's tenure208, 
After Cyberia was replaced as the project manager for the N2 Gateway, Cape 
Town law firm, Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom was appointed to investigate 
whether Cyberia's appointment was politically motivated, Their findings show 
that there was no hard evidence to suggest that Cyberia's appointment was 
politically motivated but that flaws in the tender process served to 'encourage 
the view that there may have been corruption in the process,209, 
Roger Davids, the CEO of Cyberia, has been contacted but was unwilling to 
give any information relating to his companies involvement with the Gateway 
project. The newspaper, Engineering News, also failed in their bid to elicit 
information from him 
An email to the mayor was referred to project manger Roger Davids, 
who failed to answer any of the written questions posed by Engineering 
News210, 
207 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 
submitted by Thubelisha Homes, pp. 1-56. 
208 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 
submitted by Thubelisha Homes, pp. vi. 
209 Powell, A. 2006. Legal opinion given to Sisulu questioned Gateway contract. In Cape 
Times, June 23. 
210 Engineering News. 2005. Local professionals describe N2 Gateway as 'expensive joke'. 











3.10 Principle and Practice: BNG Abandoned 
The theory behind the N2 Gateway project is impressive and is an important 
step forward in social housing. If one, however, looks at evidence from the 
following examples, it is clear that the BNG policy is not being followed and 
the government is returning to the old RDP pOlic/11 . 
3.10.1 Moving people away from Economic Opportunities 
A major focus of the BNG strategy is to increase social housing densities 
(compared to those delivered in the past) to enable more people access to 
city centres and economic opportunities. This was a key goal of the N2 
Gateway project and was clearly expressed in the planning documents212 . 
The Gateway initiative is intending to deliver over 25 000 houses (initially it 
was 22 000) and it was planned that the mix of these houses would be a 
70:30 mix between multi-storey (rental) units and single story (ownership) 
units. This would effectively mean that the housing settlements would have 
high densities (rental walkups have high densities) therefore bringing more 
people closer to the Cape Town City Centre. 
Subsequent to the delivery of Phase 1 it was established that due to suspect 
planning this 70:30 mix could not be achieved, as the majority of the 
population targeted cannot afford the rental option. The targeted housing mix 
211 Snyman, J. 2006. Interview with Jac Snyman (architect of Joe Siovo Phase 1). [November 
14]. 
212 A Moment of Reflection: Media Launch of the N2 Gateway Project. 2005. [Online]. 











has thus has to be amended to a 10:90 mix of rental and ownership units213 . 
This has meant the Gateway plans have had to be radically changed as the 
initial Gateway plan aimed at producing mainly 'high density' walk up units, 
which would be offered the public on a rental basis. This re-planning has also 
led to abortive costs as some infrastructure, already 'built', has had to be 
changed. 
The experience obtained in Joe Slovo Phase 1 project 
demonstrated that the large number of previously planned 'Walk 
Up' rental units were not affordable for the majority of the 
targeted beneficiary communities. A re-planning of the 
component projects resulted in significantly lower residential 
densities being yielded with resultant increases in the amount of 
land required for the N2 Gateway component projects214. 
According to the latest N2 Business Plan, 25 750 houses are planned to be 
built and only 2 572 are going to be 'high density' walk up units. What this 
effectively means is that housing densities in the new housing settlements, 
that will replace the existing informal settlements, will drop. People will thus be 
pushed further and further away from the Cape Town City Centre215 . Delft, an 
area where over 6000 houses will be built, is around 35km from the city 
The N2 Gateway project is located in an area which is occupied by an 
estimated 200 000 people. The project aims to build around 25 000 units and 
213 Baker, K. 2006. Interview Material. Interview conducted at Thubelisha Homes Cape Town 
Office 16 October 200616:30 -19:00. 
214 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 
submitted by Thubelisha Homes, pp. 17. 
215 Evans, K. 2006. Interview Material. [Interview conducted on 16 September 2006]. 











according to the Department of Housing these houses will accommodate 
around 100 000 people217 . This is clearly problematic as there will not be 
enough housing for the people that are already living in the area and these 
people will be pushed further away from economic opportunities. 
Jac Snyman, the architect responsible for Joe Siovo Phase 1, believes that 
the N2 Gateway, in many instances, is doing nothing more than reverting back 
to the old RDP 'box-style' housing concept. The houses that will make up 90% 
of the N2 Gateway will be single storey detached units, semi detached units or 
row houses. These housing typologies require their own plots, unlike walk 
ups, which are built up vertically. Due to the dramatic change in the housing 
mix of the N2 Gateway, more land has to be found 218 . 9072 units will have to 
be built on this new land219 . The major problem is that although people will be 
provided with houses, the new land that the settlements are built on will be 
incredibly far from economic opportunities. This is in direct contrast to what 
the BNG policy document aims to achieve, but in reality it is being allowed to 
happen. 
Many people have asked how the move away from the BNG policy has been 
allowed to happen. Snyman believes that whilst it is a complex issue it boils 
217 Gophe, M. 2005. Cape Gateway needs more land for housing. In Cape Argus, November 
13. 
218 Snyman, J. 2006. Interview with Jac Snyman (architect of Joe Siovo Phase 1). [November 
14]. 
219 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 











down to political issues22o . According to him, the public demands houses from 
the government and in order to be re-elected, those who are in office promise 
the people houses in order to gain their vote. What has happened time and 
again according to Snyman, however, is that houses are built for the people, 
but these are 'unfortunately small, at a quality that will not last more than 10 or 
15 years and are built in low quality environments'221. By the time the houses 
begin to collapse due to their poor quality, the politicians that had ordered 
them to be built are no longer in politics. 
3.10.2 Joe Siovo 1 - against BNG principles 
Joe Siovo Phase One is the first housing settlement to have been completed 
in the Gateway project. It consists of 705 housing units and was completed in 
June 2006222 . All the units are structured in the high density/walk up style 
according to the BNG principles laid out in the policy document. 
The aim prior to construction of Joe Siovo Phase One was to try and develop 
the area into a highly accessible location due to its localitl23 . This would 
mean that people living in the surrounding areas could access the settlement. 
The housing settlement, however, is not open to the general public as 
planned. The area is heavily secured, with numerous security guards 
220 Snyman, J. 2006. Interview with Jac Snyman (architect of Joe Siovo Phase 1). [November 
24]. 
221 Snyman, J. 2006. Interview with Jac Snyman (architect of Joe Siovo Phase 1). [November 
24]. 
222 Evans, K. 2006. Interview Material. [Interview conducted on 16 September 2006]. 











patrolling, together with a guardhouse and access gate. This has prevented 
crime but what it also has done has not allowed the area to become the 
proposed highly accessible area. 
Early architectural plans made provision for a market area, to be constructed 
on the edge of the Joe Siovo complex, where people could trade goods. This 
market area would also act as a central meeting place for of Langa and Joe 
Siovo communities. This would have created ideal economic opportunities for 
the people of the surrounding areas. On instructions of the Minister of 
Housing, a park replaced the initial proposal for the market224 . 
The RDP houses that were constructed in the past are recognized as not 
meeting the minimum criteria for sustainable human settlements. The BNG 
strategy aims to build 'spatially and socially inclusive,225 settlements. The Joe 
Siovo Phase One settlement is falling short of this ideal. 
224 Snyman, J. 2006. Interview with Jac Snyman (architect of Joe Siovo Phase 1). [November 
14]. 
225 Breaking New Ground. 2004. A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable 












Major Lessons Learnt 
This dissertation has identified and discussed numerous problems relating to 
the N2 Gateway project. This section aims, through in-depth interviews and 
research, to try and locate solutions for the problems discussed in the 
previous chapters. In many instances lessons have been learnt and are being 
applied to the project. These 'improvements' are discussed together with the 
'future' solutions offered by a number of housing experts. 
4.1 The South African Housing Mindset 
The N2 Gateway project has identified the particular viewpoints that politicians 
have of housing. Politicians want to provide houses for the people but they fail 
to recognize the specific contexts where houses are to be built and equally 
important the specific requirements of the intended occupants226 . There is no 
disagreement amongst all players that there is an urgent need to 'solve' the 
shortage of social housing. It is the manner in which the Department of 
Housing committed themselves to the delivery of 22 000 houses in six months 
which is of serious concern. 
According to Bregman and Snyman there needs to be a synergy between the 
physical environment and the type of housing that is selected. They and other 
housing experts state that the government wanted a situation whereby three 
house designs could be selected and then mass produced in a particular 











development. This choice was incorrect according to them as this does not 
take into account the context of the area in which the housing needs to be 
delivered. In order to illustrate this, they use the example of the construction of 
shopping centres to illustrate their argument as to the process of environment 
examination that must precede the choice of house designs and development 
layout. According to Bregman and Snyman, when building shopping centres, 
a common blueprint is not followed but rather an examination of the 
environment takes place and then the centre is built. This 'environment 
examination' takes into account issues such as; access routes, parking, toilet 
facilities, the type of people that will frequent the facility etc. They argue that 
the same needs to happen with housing projects227 . 
The need for the environment examination precludes the possibility and 
therefore probability of predicting the type and quantity of houses to be built in 
a particular area. The cost of the overall housing development and each 
individual unit is affected by its context. 
4.2 Planning under Pressure 
The time pressure put on the N2 Gateway project was very ambitious and 
unrealistic. The Gateway development is a pilot initiative and to put such 
drastic time frames was problematic. Future housing projects should learn 
from this and be more conservative in their planning approach. Realistic time-
frames must be attached to development projects such as the N2 Gateway, 
according to the record of past projects. The record of housing delivery in the 











Western Cape clearly showed that the government did not have the capacity 
or access to sufficient resources (especially money) to achieve such radical 
A major problem in the N2 Gateway project has been the lack of proper 
planning. 
The entire 'process' from conceptualization to implementation was set in time 
frames that were both too ambitious and consequently a rate of delivery that 
was unrealistic. The consequence of this was a significant increase in costs 
and delays. These time frames are understandable in the particular political 
context of the President's requirement to the Minister of Housing for a new 
social housing plan which addressed the housing crisis in the shortest 
possible time frames. The upcoming local elections at the time also added 
particular political heat and expectations in respect of housing delivery. The 
politicians could have, however, a more patient approach as it was clear the 
planning phase for the Gateway was rushed229 . 
One of the consequences of the 'rushed' planning was the failure to amend 
the amending the housing subsidy system prior to the implementation of the 
project. A further consequence involved the census that was conducted for 
determining the needs of the people living in the area of the planned N2 
Gateway intervention. This census was done during the holidays, when many 
228 Ross, N. 2007. Interview Material. Interview conducted at his City of Cape Town Office in 
Constantia. April 20. 
229 Oscroft, Peter (Peter.Oscroft@capetown.gov.za) 2006. N2 Gateway Project - Masters 











of the people were not at home and thus did not yield satisfactory results. 
Both these examples show how the Department of Housing in their haste to 
deliver on their promises to the people, actually made things worse by rushing 
through the planning phase. The planning process should have been properly 
thought out from the beginning, as this would have prevented many of the 
problems that were identified and discussed in the previous chapters23o . 
The planning process was also done in a top-down manner without enough 
consultation with the general public and the beneficiaries. Evidence of this 
was seen in the rental/ownership ratio debacle, whereby less rental units are 
to be built as it was discovered that residents could not afford to pay the rental 
on the housing units (discussed in Chapter 5.10.1 )231. 
Two valuable 'planning' lessons have been learnt from the first phase of the 
Gateway project. Firstly, for a housing project to be successful it is imperative 
that the planning stage is carefully thought out and not rushed. Secondly, all 
stakeholders should be included in the planning process as without input from 
all sides the development will be 'skewed'. 
230 Baker, K. 2007. Interview Material. [Interview conducted on 8 May at the Wimpy in 
Somerset West]. 












4.3 The flawed design of the pilot project 
Peter Oscroft highlights an important lesson, which can be learnt from the 
progress of the N2 Gateway project thus far. 
A pilot project requires official recognition as such and the 
authority to apply non standard instruments to implement. The 
inertia of the legislative processes mitigate against the very 
concept of a pilot. Grand visions which exceed the capacity of 
existing policies to fund them, cannot be realized. 22 000 
houses in one year, when the City has only been funded to 
produce 8 000 per year, is not a pilot! A pilot should be at a 
small scale, realizable by limited extension of existing policy. 
Alternatively the policy should be changed before the project 
proceeds, but then the project would no longer be a pilotF32 
The 'pilot' nature of the N2 Gateway was also a problematic concept, 
according to Kevan Baker. According to him, the project has not been formally 
approved by Parliament, as the first Business Plan that was submitted was 
not accepted. The consequence is that the N2 Gateway is an unstable 
initiative, as it has no firm foundation. This thus creates major confusion as to 
what the project is actually piloting. Is the project piloting the new BNG 
house? Is the project piloting how the new BNG strategy fits in with the old 
housing policy? In order for the N2 Gateway to move forward these questions 
must be answered and a ratification of the project should take place233. 
232 Oscroft, Peter (Peter.Oscroft@capetown.gov.za) 2006. Masters Thesis. [Personal email, 
31 October] to Paul Blake (blkpau002@mail.uct.ac.za). 












4.4 Project Management and Tendering Procedures 
One of the major lessons that have been learnt from the N2 Gateway thus far 
has been the importance of a high-quality project manager. Cyberia's 
appointment to manage the Gateway initiative was one of the many downfalls 
of the project. Since Thubelisha's involvement, the Gateway project has taken 
a positive step forward. 
It is clear from the Gateway example that a transparent and clear tendering 
process is needed when awarding project management tenders for future 
housing projects. The manner in which Cyberia was selected was fraught with 
controversy and caused unnecessary problems for the housing project234. 
Cyberia had also never managed a housing project before, which according to 
many housing experts was a key characteristic that was needed in order to 
run the N2 Gateway project successfully235. 
4.5 Housing Allocation 
As a consequence of the waiting list debacle, Thubelisha has been given the 
responsibility of managing the allocation process. The formal allocation policy 
that Thubelisha has developed for the N2 Gateway is focused on certain 
principles aimed at solving the allocation problems identified in Chapter 5.7. 
An example of this is that a beneficiary will have to show proof of their 
234 Cape Argus, 2006. Probe into multi-million rand city tender deals granted without council 
approval. [Online] http://www.12b.co.za/Construction_News/Article/Articie [Site accessed on 
22 May 2007]. 











residency in a particular area and have the correct qualifications to receive a 
state subsidy. The new policy is also based on principles of Fairness, 
Transparency and Consistencl36 . Not much further information is given on 
this new approach but hopefully it will solve many of the allocation problems 
that have occurred. 
4.6 Transparent Communication 
The 'communication' around the N2 Gateway project has caused numerous 
problems. The communication between those responsible for delivering the 
project and the public was problematic. Promises were made to the people 
and these promises were not kept, causing much resentment from the public 
(as discussed in Chapter 5.1). The reason for this was the lack of 
communication between the politicians and the people working on the ground. 
It has been identified by Thubelisha that 'the current capacity [Within the N2 
Gateway communication structures] - to share information, ideas and new 
approaches has been limited 237 . In many cases it was shown that politicians 
were making blanket statements to the media without adequate consultation 
with those who actually knew the realities of the situation. Going forward, this 
should be a crucial lesson that should be learnt from, as with better 
communication the entire process should run far more smoothly. 
236 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 
submitted by Thubelisha Homes, pp. 1-56. 
237 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 











Thubelisha's latest Business Plan includes measures to improve 
communication and contains many lessons learnt from the first phase of the 
project. The Government Communication Information Service (GCIS) has 
been awarded the responsibility of improving the N2 Gateway's 
communications strategy. A plan will be drawn up and presented to the 
National Minister of Housing. The mandate for the 'communication plan' states 
that it will recognize and address three categories of stakeholder groups. The 
terms of reference of the mandate are as follows. Firstly, it will create a 
communications structure within the three tiers of government. Secondly, the 
new communications strategy will have a 'marketing leg' to ensure the media 
and academia together with the financial and professional institutions are 
constantly kept up to date. Thirdly, NGO's and CBO's and beneficiary 
communities will be included in the communications strategy through a 
'community engagement leg,238. It is interesting to note that the beneficiary 
communities are placed last on this list, when it is clear to many critics that 
their voice should be the loudest. 
The N2 Gateway Communications Strategy, which will form the blueprint for 
future housing projects, will be the end product of a collaborative effort 
between the GCIS, the National Department of Housing, the Provincial 
Government of the Western Cape and Thubelisha. All four of these 
stakeholders will represent the Communications Task Team for the N2 
Gateway. It is hoped that this Communication Strategy will learn from 
experiences of the N2 Gateway thus far. 
238 N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended and 











4.7 Theory vs Practice 
One of the central concerns of this paper is the manner in which the N2 
Gateway project has deviated from its theoretical roots. The BNG policy is a 
sound policy built upon the criticisms of the previous RDP housing strategy. 
The BNG plan puts forward a theory that takes into account many of the 
needs that were missed by earlier housing projects. It stresses the need for 
better quality housing and focuses not solely on housing but on building 
communities, which should be brought closer to economic opportunities and 
social amenities. 
This paper demonstrates that the N2 Gateway is not following the basic 
principles outlined above. Due to the high demand for housing the 
government has seemingly reverted back to the RDP strategy to ensure that 
people are given houses239 . It is evident from the Joe Siovo example that the 
focus is purely on building houses as very few community facilities were built. 
This theory versus practice dilemma needs to be addressed. The new BNG 
policy is more expensive than the RDP housing strategy but it is a far more 
sustainable approach. The government needs to consider this issue for future 
housing projects. At present many people will be housed through the N2 
Gateway project, but it is anticipated that in fifteen years time the government 
will identify the same problems that resulted from the RDP strategy 
implemented before. 












4.8 High Density 
The BNG aims to deliver higher social housing densities (compared to those 
delivered in the past) so that more people are brought closer to economic 
opportunities and community facilities. What the N2 Gateway has shown is 
that this not actually the case as the 'one house one plot mentality persists,24o. 
The reason for this is that it is cheaper to build single house structures. This is 
true in the short run but according to Snyman, 
.. .it is from all perspectives cheaper and better to build high density. As 
with all things, such as alternative forms of energy, recycling water, etc, 
the start up costs are higher (not that much). However, low density as 
we are doing now is disastrous in the long run241 . 
Snyman states that the reason for the continuation of the 'one house one plot 
mentality' is that in the majority of cases the advisors to the housing officials 
are specialist engineers who tend to look at the short term costs of the 
structures only, without examining costs over a longer period. This is an issue 
that must be addressed if future housing projects in South Africa are going to 
be successful. Cape Town, like many other South African cities, does not 
have a great deal of open land near the city centre and thus what land there is 
available must be used intelligently. 
240 Bregman, M. & Snyman, J. 2007. Interview Material. Interview conducted on May 4. 













The Way Forward 
5.1 The N2 Gateway Future 
The timeframe of the N2 Gateway has been extended once again. The 
Department of Housing has a current delivery date of March 2010. This is a 
far more viable commitment and is a more realistic timeframe242 . The NDOH, 
PGWC and Thubelisha Homes will still be under severe pressure to deliver on 
this promise after all the problems experienced thus far. 
The latest Business Plan explicitly identifies the numerous success factors 
that must be secured if it is to achieve its objectives by March 2010. It is 
important to note the magnitude of some of these factors. Re-assessing the 
initial goals and claims for the N2 Gateway within the parameters of the latest 
Business Plan both emphasizes the criticisms of the haste with which it was 
implemented and underscores the 'unrealistic' time frames presented by the 
Department of housing. The two chief factors that will need to be secured are 
extra funding and land. A full account of the success 'requirements' is given in 
Appendix B243. 
242 Baker, K. 2007. Interview Material. [Interview conducted on 8 May at the Wimpy in 
Somerset West]. 
243 Data from N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended 











5.2 Alternative Options 
In 2005 the ANC led City of Cape Town made a public commitment to 
eradicate informal settlements by 2014244. This goal was and is not achievable 
in the particular set of conditions that prevail, namely, the present housing 
backlog, the money available and the existing pace of housing delivery. Jac 
Snyman argues that an incremental approach to this goal would be far more 
manageable245. 
Snyman argues that the government's fixation on delivering houses in not 
helpful to addressing the housing problem in fact it exacerbates the problem. 
He argues that this fixation encourages people to expect and demand houses 
and order for politicians to be re-elected they need to respond to these 
demands. The combination of these factors causes small low-quality houses 
to be built. These houses neither fulfill the BNG criteria nor are they 
sustainable or durable. The houses do not last more than ten or fifteen years 
and then the whole process repeats itself. Snyman suggests that an 
incremental approach would address these problems. Here is his example: 
If one looks at the sites, where the N2 Gateway is being built, it is fairly easy 
to determine some of the major problems that the residents are experiencing. 
The residents of Joe Siovo, for example, suffer from: fires, flooding and lack of 
244 Ensor, L. 2005. Bureaucracy Pulls Out Stops for New Cape Housing Project. In Business 
Day, February 17. 












adequate ablutions. There is not enough money or space to build everyone a 
quality BNG home to protect people from these problems. New solutions must 
be found. Firstly, each existing settlement can be raised, by building it on its 
own concrete platform, which will put an end to the flooding problem. 
Secondly, fire walls can be erected within houses, which will prevent the 
spread of fires. Thirdly, ablutions can be built outside for each home. These 
three changes will cost a fraction of what it would cost to house all the people 
of the area. The government can afford to make these changes, and although 
they are not of a grand nature, they will improve the lives of people living in 
those areas246 . 
Warren Smit of the Development Action Group puts forward a theory, which 
correlates with some of Snyman's ideas highlighted above. In Smit's 
presentation to the Friends of DAG Seminar on the N2 Gateway Project247 , he 
identifies ten issues which should be remembered when upgrading informal 
settlements. His seventh point highlights the importance of upgrading in situ 
wherever possible. According to Smit in situ upgrading is always preferable to 
relocation as this will maintain social and economic links and networks. This 
concurs with Snyman's approach as it stresses the need in upgrading the 
existing settlements without making drastic changes to the environment. Smit 
further argues that if people are going to be relocated, it must be to well-
located land. This thesis has previously shown that this is not happening in 
the case of the N2 Gateway as people are being moved further and further 
246 Bregman, M. & Snyman, J. 2007. Interview Material. Interview conducted on May 4. 
247 Smit, W. 2005. Presentation at DAG Seminar on the N2 Gateway Project: 10 Things to 











away from economic opportunities and from their existing links (the example 
of Joe Siovo residents being moved to Delft). 
Another theory put forward by Erik Schaug, a chartered architect an urban 
designer, argues that building societies should be brought back to help solve 
the housing crisis. Building societies were introduced in Britain in the 19th 
century to enable the less well-off to build houses and were incredibly 
successful. By re-introducing building societies, it would bring about a simple 
and cost-effective banking system for small investors and a source of capital 
for the construction of houses for the poor. 
Building societies, like banks will, however, not lend money for houses being 
built in unsuitable areas without unsustainable environments. To solve this 
Schaug suggests that site-and-service schemes should be reintroduced but 
that these sites should be built intelligently with the potential to be developed. 
The urban designing process will be crucial for these settlements as proper 
planning will bring about economic opportunities to the area. 
In order to create employment and job opportunities in these housing sites 
(the main problem found in many housing projects), he suggests that micro-
enterprise zones should be created. These zones would be specified areas 
nearby low-income developments where entrepreneurs can build job-creating 
facilities. These entrepreneurs would be aided with tax incentives, low rates 
and energy costs. He goes further to argue that VAT on all basic building 











income population. These measures would allow small-scale building 
contractors to open businesses and provide modest houses for the poor. 
According to him, many township residents have completed courses in 
building trades but have been unable to find opportunities to use their skills in 
the last ten years. This process would enable them to find work and thus 
alleviate problems of unemployment, while at the same time providing houses 
for the poor. Schaug suggests that although this strategy will not completely 
solve the housing crisis, it could be used as a start248 . 
248 Schaug, E. 2007. Bring back building societies to help get a grip on the housing backlog. 












The N2 Gateway project is a sorely needed initiative. The project, if 
completed, will house over 100 000 people and will bring a much needed 
'facelift' to many informal settlements in Cape Town. It is a pilot project, which 
intends to put an end to many of the unsustainable and inadequate housing 
developments that have preceded it. The premier focus of the N2 Gateway 
project is delivering not only houses but sustainable human settlements. 
Through public and private partnerships it plans to produce settlements that 
will give people access to economic opportunities and community facilities. It 
is anticipated that through this project, beneficiaries will be brought closer to 
the Cape Town city centre and the standard of living for many individuals will 
improve. 
Evidence presented in this paper has, however, shown that like many other 
developmental projects across the African continent, the N2 Gateway has 
failed to deliver on its promises. What was seen in theory has not been 
produced in practice. The Breaking New Ground Theory and the policy 
documents on the N2 Gateway are coherently packaged, persuasive and well 
written but the realisation of this particular pilot initiative was and is prevented 
by numerous implementation problems. These problems have ranged from 
funding predicaments to poor planning. It is imperative that these problems 
are acknowledged and addressed as this will allow the N2 Gateway Project 











Shortcomings of Research 
My research process and fieldwork was characterized by obstacles and 
difficulties due to the topical and controversial nature of the N2 Gateway. I 
discovered that information recovery on a project that has not lived up to 
expectations is problematic. My experience is one of an inability to locate 
public documentation and uncooperative officials who remained quiet in 
response to my legitimate requests. If I was able to speak officials many of 
them would disclaim knowledge of the project or would 'make me go away' by 
giving me the name of those 'who would know' (Peter Oscroft, the City 
Council's Project Manager, was the most common choice). 
It was incredibly difficult to locate certain important documents relating to the 
N2 Gateway project. An example of this was the First N2 Gateway Business 
Plan. This document would have been incredibly useful for my research but I 
have failed in all my attempts to locate it. I was promised it on numerous 
occasions by housing officials but these 'promises' never materialized. 
In my pursuit of information in respect of the highly controversial decision to 
award Cyberia the contract for the N2 Gateway initiative I encountered 'the 
case of willingness and even enthusiasm with no follow through'. I was drawn 
to the Cyberia 'issue' as I wanted to uncover the real story behind the 
accusations and media attacks. I contacted Roger Davids, of Cyberia, in 
August 2006 and asked whether he would be willing to answer a few 











research process and even suggested that we should meet to discuss the 
Gateway initiative. To this date, after numerous emails and phone calls, I have 
yet to yield any response from Mr Davids. His input would have been 
extremely valuable to my research. Through my research I also uncovered 
that I was not the only person who struggled to get comments from Mr Davids. 
The newspaper, Engineering News, also failed in their bid to contact him - 'An 
email to the mayor was referred to project manger Roger Davids, who failed to 
answer any of the written questions posed by Engineering News'249. 
I contacted the ex-mayor Mrs Nomaindia Mfeketo. She agreed to answer a 
few questions on the Gateway initiative. To this date, she has not replied even 
after two phone calls, in which she promised to respond to a fax that was sent 
to her. Both Mrs Mfeketo and Mr Davids were critical figures in the early 
stages of the N2 Gateway development and their insights would have added 
great value to my research. 
The fast-tracking process, which took place with regards to the N2 Gateway, 
has also made the research process problematic. The reason for this is that 
many decisions were made via private emails and cell phone calls and these 
conversations were not documented. This has therefore made it incredibly 
difficult to track all the exact events as they unfolded. This is also a matter of 
concern as the planning and implementation of the N2 Gateway was clearly 
not conducted in a transparent and accountable manne~50. 
249 Engineering News. 2005. Local professionals describe N2 Gateway as 'expensive joke'. 
[Online] http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article [Site accessed on 18 May 2007]. 
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The Objectives of the BNG Policy251 
• Accelerating the delivery of housing as a key strategy for poverty 
alleviation 
• Utilizing provision of housing as a major job creation strategy 
• Ensuring property can be accessed by all as an asset for wealth 
creation and empowerment 
• Leveraging growth in the economy 
• Combating crime, promoting social cohesion and improving quality of 
life for the poor 
• Supporting the function of the entire single residential property market 
to reduce duality within the sector by breaking the barriers between the 
first economy residential property boom and the second economy 
slump 
• Utilizing housing as an instrument for the development of sustainable 
human settlements, in support of spatial restructuring 
251 Breaking New Ground. 2004. A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable 











• Promoting and facilitating an affordable rental and social housing 
market 
• Promoting upgrading of informal settlements 












Key Success Factors for the N2 Gateway Projece52 
• Additional Greenfields land supply (Greenfield: term used to describe 
land that still needs to be developed), as without this land, the 
residential sites will not be able to be built. 
• Finalization of the basic dwelling unit standards and specifications to be 
piloted through the N2 Gateway project. (It seems unsettling that 
finalization still needs to be secured on this issue after it was promised 
that the houses would be delivered by June 2005). 
• Supplementary funding to fund the shortfalls mentioned earlier in the 
paper. 
• Commitment by the relevant line Departments to finance and supply 
the Social Infrastructure in the various projects. 
• Supply of supplementary grant and loan finances to achieve the March 
2010 delivery date. 
252 Data from N2 Gateway Business Plan September 2006: Draft 6. 2006. Updated, amended 











• The need for the three tiers of government to mobilize the capacity 
needed to ensure community safety in the component development 
projects that are to be implemented. 
• Assembly of an integrated intergovernmental allocations policy 
procedure system and the assembly of the capacity needed to 
implement such a policy and system. 
• Intergovernmental acceptance and adherence to the new N2 Gateway 
Project Communications and Marketing system and programme. 
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